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Past research has examined the effect of resource constraints on client-continuance 
decisions, but no studies to date have examined how these resource constraints affect the relation 
between various determinants and client-continuance decisions. In this study, I examine whether 
the determinants of auditor client-continuance decisions vary with the auditor’s resource 
constraints, proxied for by whether the client has a December year-end (i.e., busy season client) 
versus a non-December year-end. I posit that auditors are more sensitive to client risks when 
anticipated resources are constrained. I find that some determinants of auditor client-continuance 
decisions differ between busy season and non-busy season clients, suggesting that auditors allow 
anticipated resource constraints to affect their client-continuance decisions. On average, across 
the full sample, auditors are less likely to continue working with busy season clients that issue 
non-timely 10-k filings (audit risk) and have higher market-value of equity (litigation risk) 
relative to non-busy season clients that also issue non-timely 10-K filings and have higher 
market-value of equity. For the auditor-client relationships that continue, auditors allocate more 
resources to busy season clients with low earnings quality and risky account balances (audit 
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In this study, I examine whether the determinants of auditor client-continuance decisions 
vary with the auditor’s resource constraints, proxied for by whether the client has a December 
year-end (i.e., a busy season client) versus a non-December year-end. During the preliminary 
engagement activities, auditors are supposed to anticipate potential risks and evaluate whether to 
continue or discontinue their relationship with the client. Client-continuance decisions are 
important to audit firms because the auditor’s choice to maintain a relationship with the client 
means continuing with client-specific risks (e.g., weak internal controls, incentives to manipulate 
earnings, etc.). However, it is unclear whether auditors respond to client risks differently when 
their resources are constrained.  
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) planning standards dictate 
that auditors assess the nature, timing, and extent of resources needed to complete an audit 
(PCAOB AS 2101, par. 10). Additionally, auditors’ quality control (QC) policies state, “Auditors 
only continue auditing clients for whom the auditor can reasonably expect to complete audits 
with professional competence based on assessments of the risks of material misstatement for the 
client” (PCAOB QC 20, par. 15). In order to respond to higher risks of material misstatement, 
auditors can allocate resources in three ways: obtain more evidence (quantity); obtain higher-
quality evidence (quality); or obtain evidence closer to year-end (timing). Alternatively, if the 
risks are too high and the auditor’s costs to obtain sufficient evidence to offset those risks are too 
high, the auditor can decide to end the auditor-client relationship, thereby eliminating the risks 
associated with that client from the auditor’s client portfolio. 
Auditor resource allocation is particularly important for busy season clients because the 
timing of these engagements forces auditors to operate at maximum capacity. During busy 
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season, auditors try to maximize their audit efficiency while minimizing exposure to the risks of 
litigation claims or reputational costs due to failed audits (i.e., audits that fail to discover a 
material misstatement) (Biery 2018; DeZoort and Lord 1997). Because higher-risk audits require 
more time, more evidence, and/or more audit procedures closer to the client’s fiscal year-end, 
higher-risk clients can encumber a substantial portion of available resources during busy season, 
leaving fewer resources available for other engagements. In contrast, during the non-busy 
season, while these firms have roughly similar resources available year-round, the non-busy 
season presents only a fraction of busy season’s client demands, thus making it less likely that 
resources assigned to riskier clients will take resources from the remaining clients. Anecdotally, 
during the non-busy season, audit staff are in the office waiting to be assigned to an engagement, 
which suggests that plenty of resources are available to audit higher risk clients.1  
Prior literature finds that auditor changes are more likely for companies with indications 
of earnings management (audit risk), financial distress (financial risk), or legal liability exposure 
(litigation risk). (Ghosh and Tang 2015; Johnstone and Bedard 2004; Kim and Park 2014; 
Krishnan, Sun, and Yang 2013; Landsman, Nelson, and Rountree 2009; Mande and Son 2013; 
Shu 2000). Some auditor changes are also initiated by the client. Whether the auditor resigns, 
increases fees to the extent that the client does not want to continue, or does not discount the 
audit fees to the point at which the client will retain them, auditor changes are often viewed from 
the perspective of an auditor’s client-continuance decisions (Bockus and Gigler 1998). Auditors 
are less likely to continue working with clients with poor financial reporting quality (audit risk), 
financial distress (financial risk), or legal liability exposure (litigation risk).  
                                                 
1 Auditors are still responsible for reviewing quarterly financial statements or auditing benefit plans in the non-busy 
season, but the quantity of resources needed to review quarterly financial statements and audit benefit plans is not 
nearly as demanding as auditing annual financial statements (Lopez and Peters, 2011). 
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Theory on resource constraints suggests that pressure and stress are a function of 
environmental demand, constraints, resources and the balance thereof (French, Caplan, and Van 
Harrison 1982; Lazarus 1995; Spielberger and Reheiser 1995). In an auditing context, prior 
literature consistently finds that resource constraints in the form of time pressure negatively 
impact the effectiveness of auditor tasks (Alderman and Deitrick 1982; Bills, Swanquist, and 
Whited 2016; DeZoort and Lord 1994; Kelly and Margheim 1990; Rhode 1978). Because 
resources are naturally constrained during busy season, I hypothesize that concerns about 
workload constraints could affect the determinants of auditors’ client-continuance decisions. In 
other words, auditors may be more sensitive to factors that increase the audit’s riskiness – such 
as the risk of material misstatement (audit risk), financial distress (financial risk), or legal 
liability exposure (litigation risk) for busy season clients than for non-busy season clients.  
My sample includes 31,839 auditor-client engagement observations during the period 
from 2004 through 2015. Using Audit Analytics, I identify all 8-K announcements for auditor 
switches to proxy for the auditors’ client-continuance decisions. Following prior literature, I 
estimate the determinants of client continuance using three types of audit engagement risk 
factors: (1) audit risk (or risk of issuing an incorrect audit opinion), measured as an absolute 
value of discretionary accruals (following Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny, 1995), revenue growth, 
internal control over financial reporting weakness, non-timely financial reporting (Wang, 
Raghunandan, and McEwen 2013), mergers and acquisitions, and the ratio of inventory and 
receivables to total assets; (2) financial risks (or client business risks), measured as return on 
assets, whether the client experienced a loss in the prior year, the ratio of leverage to total assets, 
the ratio of cash to total assets, and the Altman  Z-score (1968) as modified by Shumway (2001); 
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and (3) litigation risks, measured according to the client’s market-value of equity and the highly 
litigious industries, following Matsumoto (2002). 
For many of the factors examined, there is no difference in auditor client-continuance 
decisions between busy-season and non-busy season clients, suggesting that auditors did not 
allow anticipated resource constraints to affect their client-continuance decisions. However, 
consistent with my hypothesis, I find a few instances where auditors have risk preferences that 
are different when their resources are constrained (i.e., the client is audited during busy season) 
compared to when resources are not constrained. First, on average across the full sample, 
auditors are less likely to continue working with busy season clients who were late filing their 
annual financial statements with the SEC (audit risk) and had high market-value of equity 
(litigation risk) compared to non-busy season clients. Second, during the post-SOX period, 
auditors were less likely to continue working with busy season clients with a material weakness 
of internal controls (audit risk), high leverage (financial risk), and high market-value of equity 
(litigation risk) compared to non-busy season clients. Third, Big Four auditors are less likely to 
continue working with busy season clients with a material weakness of internal controls (audit 
risk), high leverage (financial risk), and high market-value of equity (litigation risk) compared to 
non-busy season clients. The overall lack of significant differences between busy and non-busy 
seasons may be attributed to client-acceptance decisions made with these risks and anticipated 
resources in mind. Therefore, I examine a sample of auditor-client engagements that do not 
switch in the prior year to examine how auditors respond to client risk when resources are 
constrained. I find that more resources are allocated to earnings quality and risky account 
balances (audit risk), and clients with weak financial performance (financial risk). These results 
suggest that auditors are strategic with initial client-acceptance decisions and either engage with 
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clients who fit their risk preferences or allocate additional resources to address the client’s risk. 
Thus, auditors do not always have to weigh the risks of busy versus non-busy season when 
reevaluating these clients during continuance decisions. 
My study makes a number of contributions to the audit literature. First, I add to the 
literature on auditor client-continuance by demonstrating the importance of resource constraints 
on the determinants of auditor client-continuance decisions. Second, I provide evidence 
suggesting that, as seen in client-continuance decisions and audit effort, auditors’ sensitivity to 
audit, financial, and litigation risk does differ depending on the resources available. Third, this 
study sheds some light on the asymmetric preferences of auditors during the client-continuance 
decision-making process. Finally, this study contributes to regulators, specifically the PCAOB 
and their inspections of an audit firm’s quality control effectiveness, which includes inspecting 
how the auditor addresses the risks of their clients. These results should be of interest to the 
PCAOB in determining whether these asymmetric risk preferences are in line with PCAOB 
expectations and standards. 
In the next section, I document the prior literature and hypothesis development. Section 
Three describes the model development and the determinants included therein (i.e., audit risk, 
financial risk, and litigation risk), after which, I discuss my results and additional analysis. The 




2. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Client-Continuance Decisions  
Each year, the auditor must decide whether to continue or end the audit engagement with 
each client. Client-continuance decisions are important to every audit firm’s overall quality 
control because they are a tool to manage the auditor’s exposure to clients with certain negative 
characteristics that should be avoided (e.g., the client has a bad reputation or poor financial 
reporting quality). However, the PCAOB audit standards are vague and provide little insight as 
to what auditors should consider when making the client-continuance decisions, possibly because 
even the highest-risk clients need assurance services, and specific standards could deter auditors 
from accepting them. Audit engagement planning guidance and quality control standards require 
the auditor to consider modifying engagement terms or discontinuing the auditor-client 
relationship in response to identified risks (PCAOB AS 2101, par. 6a). This guidance requires 
the auditor to consider information from the previous audit: the environment, the management’s 
“tone at the top,” and other factors that could adversely affect the integrity of the audit and 
professional service provided (PCAOB AS 2105, par .5).  
Client-continuance procedures should be designed to provide reasonable assurance that 
the firm (1) “appropriately consider the risks associated with providing professional services in 
the particular circumstances”, and (2) “undertakes only those engagements that the firm can 
reasonably expect to be completed with professional competence” (PCAOB QC 20, par. 15). The 
auditor is also responsible for establishing policies and procedures that obtain an understanding 
of the client to minimize the risk of misunderstanding the nature, scope, and limitations of audit 
services to be performed (PCAOB QC 20, par. 16). Therefore, auditors must evaluate the client’s 
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risks and the audit firm’s capability to manage those risks to determine whether continuing the 
auditor-client relationship is in line with applicable professional standards.  
In addition to these standards, prior literature has shed light on the topic of client-
continuance through interviews and empirical studies. Gendron (2002) discusses the decision-
making process of client acceptance and retention and how the client-continuance decision is 
more difficult than the initial acceptance, while Bockus and Gigler (1998) use analytical 
modeling to explain why audit firms discontinue their relationship with clients based on client 
risk. They show that litigation risk is more likely to result in an auditor discontinuing the auditor-
client relationship, which is consistent with archival results examining auditor changes and 
litigation risk. Shu (2000) finds that client legal exposure and increased client legal exposure also 
affect the auditor’s client-continuance decision. Other studies examine how the auditor’s overall 
portfolio risk and shifts in overall portfolio risk affect the client continuance decision. These 
studies demonstrate that auditors shed clients with higher risk (Johnstone and Bedard 2004; 
Landsman et al. 2009; Schroeder and Hogan 2013).  
For example, following the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act and the collapse of Arthur 
Andersen, the Big Four firms were faced with a potential influx of new clients. Instead of 
dividing all the clients among the remaining Big Four, studies find that the Big Four accepted the 
higher quality Andersen clients and shed existing riskier clients to realign the overall portfolio 
risk with the influx of potential clients (Landsman et al. 2009). These client-continuance 
decisions and portfolio rebalancing were based on concerns about (1) the increased workload 
post-SOX (due to new requirements about testing internal controls) and (2) auditors becoming 
more conservative about the client-level risks they were willing to maintain (Landsman et al. 
2009). Empirically, Landsman et al. (2009) find that changes in client portfolios post-Andersen 
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and post-SOX were driven by concerns about auditor-client misalignment, rather than by 
concerns about client risk.  
Following the implementation of AS No. 5, which reduced a substantial amount of 
internal control testing required post-SOX, Schroeder and Hogan (2013) examine whether 
auditors’ concerns about lost revenues would encourage auditors to take on riskier clients 
compared to the post-SOX period. Contrary to these concerns, Schroeder and Hogan (2013) find 
that Big Four auditors’ portfolio risk, after the implementation of AS No. 5, was unchanged, and 
auditors continued to decrease the probability of auditor-client misalignment, even under 
pressures to lower fees. 
2.2 Effects of Resource Constraints 
The literature on resource constraints suggests that pressure and stress are a function of 
environmental demand, constraints, resources and the balance thereof (French et al. 1982; and 
Lazarus 1995; Spielberger and Reheiser 1995). The empirical evidence in auditing studies 
consistently documents how resource constraints decrease the effectiveness of auditors 
(Alderman and Deitrick 1982; Bills et al. 2016; DeZoort and Lord 1994; Kelly and Margheim 
1990; McDaniel 1990; Rhode 1978). For example, Bills et al. (2016) find that audit offices with 
high client growth that subject their staff to a higher workload have lower audit quality. 
McDaniel (1990) finds that audit effectiveness decreases with time pressure, with or without 
structure. Moreover, pressure affects individuals differently depending on the necessary tasks 
performed and the level of experience.2  
Many studies have documented the negative effects of pressure on the ability to audit 
effectively. However, the accounting literature has done little to examine whether auditors 
                                                 
2 Workload/time pressure, client pressure, and litigation pressure all impact task efficiency and effectiveness. 
DeZoort and Lord (1997) provide a review and synthesis of the effects of pressure in accounting research . 
9 
 
behave differently or are more sensitive to certain risks than to others during the client-
continuance decision-making process.  
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
One of the most commonly discussed topics in practitioner blogs and articles is the 
increased effort required during busy season. This time period typically extends from January to 
March and requires auditors to work an elevated number of hours each week (often more than 14 
hours per day [Butcher, 2016]) to meet deadlines for busy season clients. Moreover, the hours 
worked during busy season are similar to the hours worked in investment banking, but without 
the increase in pay (Butcher 2016; 2017). Busy season clients make up 64% of an auditor’s fees 
in a given year (Lopez and Peters 2012), and these clients all have 10-K filing requirements 
ranging from 60 to 90 days following year-end. While auditors have gone to substantial lengths 
to improve the effectiveness of interim testing (Appelbaum, Kogan, and Vasalheyli 2017), 
auditing standards suggest that auditors should wait closer to year-end when auditing their 
client’s highest-risk accounts and assertions (e.g., inventory valuation, accounts receivable 
confirmation, and management’s estimates) (PCAOB AS 2301, par. 14). Thus, a substantial 
amount of work will always remain in the busy season. 
Empirical studies document how auditors allocate resources based on engagement 
characteristics such as size, industry affiliation, client complexity, risk, and non-audit services 
(Choi, Kim, and Zang 2010; Eshleman and Guo 2014; Hackenbrak and Knechel 1997). There is 
a positive relation between the client’s risk and the hours worked on the audit engagement (Bell, 
Landsman, and Shackelford 2001), and auditors are not always able to recoup the costs of the 
additional effort required to offset client risk (Bockus and Gigler 1998). Bell et al. (2001) find 
that, on average, the profit margin on clients with more risk is not higher than the profit margin 
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for clients with lower risk. These results suggest that audit effort is allocated to riskier clients to 
avoid the negative consequences of a failed audit. Other studies find that auditors examine the 
client’s characteristics and continue with more attractive clients (Johnston and Bedard 2004). 
Thus, auditors have incentives to shed these riskier clients and to shift effort to less risky ones, 
especially when resources are constrained. 
The demand for assurance services and audit resources are higher during the busy season 
than during the non-busy season, creating a high-pressure environment. Approximately 67% of 
all audit opinions are issued during busy season; however, auditor resources are relatively fixed. 
Higher risk clients take up a substantial portion of busy season resources because higher risk 
requires more time, more evidence, and or evidence closer to year-end, leaving fewer resources 
available for other engagements. In contrast, during the non-busy season, auditors have roughly 
the same resources available, yet have a fraction of the client demands, making it less likely that 
resources assigned to riskier clients will take away from the remaining clients. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect resource constraints in the form of time pressure to produce differences 
between auditors’ risk preferences for busy season and non-busy season clients.  
Considering the relation between the busy season and resource constraints, I posit that 
auditors will have different risk preferences for client-continuance decisions for busy season 
clients when resources are more constrained than with the non-busy season clients when auditors 
have more unencumbered resources. Stated in the alternative form:  
H1: The determinants of client-continuance will differ between busy season and non-
busy season clients. 
Based on the relation between the busy season and resource allocation, I posit that 
auditors who continue working with their clients adjust their audit fees to mitigate the anticipated 
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audit, financial, and litigation risks for busy season clients compared to non-busy season clients. 
Stated in the alternative form: 
H2: When an auditor-client relationship continues from year t-1 to year t, the 




3. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 I focus on the effect that the anticipated resource constraints of auditing during busy 
season have on determinants of auditor client-continuance decisions (i.e., audit, financial, and 
litigation). In the remainder of this section, I will discuss each of these determinants, beginning 
with audit risk.  
3.1 Audit Risk 
The PCAOB defines audit risk as “the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate 
audit opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated, i.e., the financial statements 
are not presented fairly in conformity with the applicable financial reporting framework.” Audit 
risk is a function of the risk of material misstatement and detection risk (PCAOB AS 1101, par. 
4). Detection risk is the type and amount of evidence that an auditor obtains to offset the risk of 
material misstatement; the higher the risk of material misstatement, the higher the quality and 
quantity of audit evidence that the auditor must obtain. However, detection risk is unobservable. 
Therefore, I proxy for audit risk using client characteristics that have been shown to be 
associated with the risk of material misstatement. Specifically, I use abnormal discretionary 
accruals using performance-adjusted modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995; Jones 1991), 
following (Kothari et al. 2005), to proxy for earnings quality (Doyle, Weili, and McVay 2007).3 I 
include revenue growth to proxy for the risk associated with clients with significant expansion 
(Woo and Koh 2001). The risk of material misstatement is also high for clients with weak 
internal controls over the financial reporting process (Knechel and Payne 2001), thus, I include 
whether the company reported a disclosure control weakness in Section 302 or 404 report. I also 
                                                 
3 Using all firms in Compustat with available data, I estimate the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) 
cross-sectionally by year and two-digit SIC industry following Kothari et al. (2005). Thus, I estimate the 
performance-adjusted modified Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) by including lagged return-on-assets 
and retaining only those industry-years with a minimum of 10 observations.  
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include whether the client issued the annual financial statement late (non-timely filing notice) to 
proxy for alternative risk factors captured due to delays in the financial statement issuing process 
(Wang et al. 2013). Finally, to incorporate the determinants that increase the inherent risk of an 
audit due to complex transactions and risky balances, I include the ratio of inventory and 
receivables to total assets and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client experiences a 
significant merger and acquisition activity during the current year (Krishnan 1994).    
3.2. Financial Risk  
 Clients with weak financial performance have increased incentives to manipulate the 
financial statements (Choi, Doogar, and Ganguly 2004; Johnstone and Bedard 2004). 
Additionally, clients in financial distress may be less likely to maintain their relationship with the 
auditor in due to the risk of bankruptcy, so auditors may not be able to recoup their investments 
in the auditor–client relationship (Jones and Raghunandan 1998; Morgan and Stocken 1998). To 
proxy for financial risk, I include return on assets, an indicator variable for clients experiencing a 
loss, the ratio of debt to total assets, and the ratio of cash to total assets. I also include a measure 
of bankruptcy risk (Landsman et al. 2009; Schroeder and Hogan 2013; Shumway 2001). 
3.3 Litigation Risk 
 As described previously, one of the leading determinants of an auditor’s client-
continuance decision is the probability that the engagement will result in litigation for the 
auditor. Litigation risk is the risk that the auditor is sued by the client’s shareholders. This risk is 
also referred to as the auditor’s business risk (Schroeder and Hogan 2013). To proxy for 
litigation risk, I include the log of the market value of equity. Larger clients are more likely to be 
sued; they also have higher switching costs (Palmrose and Scholz 2004). Because high-risk 
industries are more likely to be sued than other industries, I follow Schroeder and Hogan (2013) 
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and include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is included in a high-risk industry as 
defined by Matsumoto (2002), and 0 if otherwise.  
3.4 Empirical Model  
 My analysis of auditor client-continuance decisions follows Lopez and Peters (2011) and 
Schroder and Hogan (2013). I extend these studies with a focus on anticipated resource 
constraints, which I posit to be an important factor in client-continuance decisions. To test H1, I 
estimate a client-continuance decision determinants model, and interact with each of the 
determinants with BUSY, an indicator variable equal to 1 for clients with a December year-end, 
and 0 otherwise. Specifically, I estimate the following logistic regression model of the likelihood 
of the client switching from one audit firm to another as a function of the auditor’s resource 
constraints and the client risk variables:  
SWITCHit+1 = β0 + BUSY + Audit Riskit + Audit Riskit * BUSY + Financial Riskit + Financial    
   Riskit * BUSY + Litigation Riskit + Litigation Riskit  * BUSY  + εit                   [1] 
 SWITCHit+1 = β0 + Audit Riskit + Financial Riskit + Litigation Riskit + εit                                                  [2] 
where:4 
BUSY, my measure of resource constraint, is the independent variable of interest, and SWITCH 
is my measure of the likelihood of auditor client-continuance. Directional predictions for the 
coefficients on the interaction terms are based on findings in prior studies (Bills et al. 2013; 
Johnstone and Bedard 2004; Landsman et al. 2009; Lopez and Peters 2011; Schroeder and 
Hogan 2013). The proxies for each type of risk are described above and defined in Table 1.  
To test H2, in which I investigate the effects of anticipated resource constraints on audit 
effort allocation when the auditor-client relationship continues, I modify the models [1] and [2]. 
                                                 
4 This model uses client-continuance determinants from Lopez and Peters (2011) and Schroder and Hogan (2013), as 
described previously.   
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Specifically, I estimate the following ordinary least squares regression model of the affect busy 
season has on the relation between an audit effort and the determinants of client continuance 
decisions for auditor-client relationships that did not realign in the previous year: 
LN_AUDFEEt = γ0 + BUSY + Audit Riskit + Audit Riskit * BUSY + Financial Riskit + 
Financial Riskit * BUSY+ Litigation Riskit + Litigation Riskit * BUSY + εit       [3] 
 LN_AUDFEEt = γ0 + Audit Riskit + Financial Riskit + Litigation Riskit + εit                                            [4] 
where:  
LN_AUDFEE, the natural log of audit fees, is my measure of audit effort.  
 I include year-fixed effects to control for time-induced variation in auditor client-
continuance decisions (SWITCH) and audit fees (LN_AUDFEE) throughout my sample period. I 
also include industry-fixed effects based on two-digit SIC codes for inherent differences in 
switching behavior between industries. All errors are clustered by client to allow for serial 
correlation between client years. I winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
of the sample.  
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4. EMPIRICAL METHOD AND RESULTS 
4.1 Sample Selection  
The sample consists of U.S. listed companies in the Compustat database from 2004 
through 2015.5 For each auditor-client engagement observation, I obtain the client’s financial 
statement information from Compustat (111,861). I use 8-K announcements of auditor changes 
from Audit Analytics to proxy for auditors switching. When I merge the specific auditor, audit 
fees, audit opinion, continuation status, and timely filing status from the Audit Analytics 
Database, I lose 23,152 observations.6 To ensure my results are not driven by very small 
companies, I eliminate observations with less than one million dollars in total assets (17,625). I 
also delete observations from regulated industries, SIC code range 6000-6999 and 4000-4999 
(22,261). Finally, I eliminate all observations with missing data for the test variables (16,729). I 
winsorize all continuous variables at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution to control for 
possible outliers at the sample level.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results 
 Descriptive statistics for my client continuance decision dependent variable measure are 
presented in Table 3. The proportion of auditor changes decreased over the sample period, 
changes related to financial statements issued for the 2004 fiscal year (the first year in the 
sample) versus the 2015 fiscal year (the last year in the sample) were 11% and 6%, respectively. 
However, the proportion of auditor changes related to financial statements issued for the fiscal 
year 2010 was the lowest at 3.5%. 
                                                 
5 In 2004, the SEC expanded the number of required 8-K reportable events to include auditor changes. Therefore, 
2004 is the earliest year for which I can obtain a comprehensive sample of auditor switches from Audit Analytics.  
6 I use the CIK linking-table in WRDS SEC Analytics Suite to address the difference between Audit Analytics’ and 
Compustat’s CIK referencing methods.  
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Univariate statistics are presented in Table 4. It is worth noting that busy-season auditor-
client relationships do not have a significantly different proportion of discontinued engagements 
compared to non-busy-season clients. The mean value of BUSY in the first column (n = 31,839) 
indicates that 67% of the observations are busy season clients. The univariate results show that 
the differences between busy season and non-busy season clients are statistically significant 
across nearly all the company characteristics. Relative to non-busy season clients, busy-season 
clients have, on average, higher discretionary accruals (Lopez and Peters 2012), revenue growth, 
likelihood of experiencing a loss, leverage, proportion of cash to assets, market value of equity, 
likelihood of being audited by one of the Big Four audit firms, and likelihood of being in a high-
risk industry. In contrast, busy season clients have a lower proportion of inventory and 
receivables, return on assets, and Altman Z-score (which suggests a higher probability of 
bankruptcy), and are less likely to issue an NT 10-K Filing. 
Correlation coefficients are reported in Table 5. The highest correlations, as expected, are 
between the proxies for financial risk: ROA, LOSS ALTMAN_Z, LEVERAGE and CASH. 
Untabulated, the mean-variance inflation factor for the model – omitting fixed effects and 
interaction terms is 6.49. Importantly, none of the correlations with my variable of interest, 
BUSY, are more than 0.12.  
4.3 Multivariate Results of Client-Continuance Decisions  
 The results for the estimation of equations [1] and [2] are reported in Table 6. Directional 
predictions for the main effect and interaction terms are based on findings in prior literature 
(Choi et al. 2004; Johnstone and Bedard 2004; Knechel and Payne 2001; Krishnan 1994; Lopez 
and Peters 2011; Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Shu 2000). For my main analysis of the effect 
resource constraints have on the determinants of auditors’ client continuance decisions, I 
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estimate three models in Panel A: (1) a fully interacted auditor continuance determinants model 
in column one; (2) an auditor continuance determinants model for busy season auditor-client 
relationships in column two; and (3) an auditor continuance determinants model for non-busy 
season auditor-client relationships in column three. I present the joint test (Determinant + 
Determinant*BUSY) in Panel B.  
4.3.1 Audit Risk  
As it relates to audit risk, the probability of auditor client-continuance is lower for 
companies with weak internal controls (ICOFR, p-value < 0.01), and delinquent 10-k filings 
(NT_FILING, p-value < 0.01). The significant interaction coefficient on NT_FILING*BUSY (p-
value < 0.10) indicates that the probability of the auditor continuing is incrementally lower when 
clients file their annual financial statements after the statutory deadlines. This suggests that the 
auditors are more sensitive to audit risk factors, measured using client-continuance decisions, for 
busy season clients compared to non-busy season clients. The joint test for the effect of 
NT_FILING on busy season clients is positive and significant, suggesting the effect of the non-
timely filing is significant for busy season clients.7  
4.3.2 Financial Risk  
 As it relates to financial risk, the probability of auditor client-continuance is lower for 
clients with non-December year-ends experiencing a loss (LOSS, p-value < 0.1), and the result 
continue for clients with December year-ends (LOSS + LOSS*BUSY, p-value > 0.01). 
However, the coefficient on the financial risk proxied by the ratio of cash to total assets suggests 
that the client’s financial risk is a significant factor for busy season client but not significant for 
                                                 
7 If I include abnormal audit fees as an audit risk factor in the model, the results do not change. Furthermore, 
auditors are not incrementally more sensitive to busy season clients that pay abnormal audit fees compared to non-
busy season clients.  
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non-busy season clients, while also not being significantly different from the probability of client 
continuance for non-busy season clients. 
4.3.3 Litigation Risk  
Finally, as it relates to litigation risk, the probability of auditor client-continuance is 
higher for large clients (SIZE, p-value < 0.01). However, the significant interaction coefficient 
on SIZE*BUSY (p-value < 0.05) indicates that the probability of the auditor continuing is 
incrementally lower for clients with high market-value of equity. This suggests that auditors are 
more sensitive to litigation risk factors, measured using client-continuance decisions, for busy 
season clients compared to non-busy season clients. The joint test for the effect of SIZE (SIZE 
+SIZE*BUSY, p-value < 0.05) on busy season client’s is negative and significant, suggesting 
that the probability of auditor client-continuance is higher for large busy season clients compared 
to small busy season clients.  
 In summary, the results in Table 6 provide some evidence that supports the resource 
constraint prediction in H1 that the determinants of client-continuance decisions vary when the 
auditors’ resources are constrained, but only when the client files a Form NT 10-K (audit risk) or 
high market-value of equity (litigation risk). Finally, there seems to be no meaningful difference 
between auditor’s sensitivity to busy season client financial risk compared to non-busy season 
clients.8 Overall, in my main sample, there appears to be marginal evidence that auditor 
realignment decisions are sensitive to concerns about resource constraints. 
 
 
                                                 
8 The decision to continue the auditor- client relationship is a joint decision between the auditor and the client. To 
control for the clients’ decision, I estimate the model with client fixed effects. The results remain largely the same. 
However, for the litigation risk, the interaction between SIZE (market-value of equity) and BUSY is not significant 
with a p-value of  0.111 compared to a p-value of 0.012.  
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4.4 Multivariate Results of Audit Effort Allocation 
To test H2, I estimate equations [3] and [4], reported in Table 7. Directional predictions for the 
main effects and interaction coefficients are based on findings in prior literature (Caramanis and 
Lennox 2007; Eshleman and Guo 2014; Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006; Simunic 1980). I only 
examine auditor-client engagement observations where the auditor-client relationship did not 
realign in the prior year.9 For my analysis of the effect resource constraints have on the relation 
between auditor effort allocation and audit, financial, and litigation risk, I estimate three models 
in Panel A:10 (1) a fully interacted auditor continuance determinants model in column one; (2) an 
auditor continuance determinants model for busy season auditor-client relationships in column 
two; and (3) an auditor continuance determinants model for non-busy season auditor-client 
relationships in column three. I present the joint test (Determinant + Determinant*BUSY) in 
Panel B. 
4.4.1 Audit Risk  
As it relates to audit risk, auditor effort is higher for companies with low reported 
discretionary accruals (ABS_DA, p-value < 0.01), low revenue growth (REV_GROWTH, p-
value, p-value < 0.01), weak internal controls (ICOFR, p-value < 0.01), delinquent 10-k filings 
(NT_FILING, p-value < 0.01), merger or acquisition (M&A, p-value <0.01), and a high ratio of 
inventory and receivable to total assets (INV_REC, p-value < 0.01). The significant interaction 
coefficient on ABS_DA*BUSY (p-value < 0.10) indicates that the audit effort is incrementally 
higher when clients have a low absolute value of discretionary accruals. This suggesting that the 
                                                 
9 The sample dropped from 31,839 observations to 24,898 observations because the restriction requires data from 
the prior year, thus eliminating the first year of my sample period, all initial auditor-client relationships that appear 
in the sample, all observations without data in the prior year, and realigned auditor-client relationships. 
10 All equations in this analysis have audit fees as the dependent variable and the determinants of client continuance 
as the independent variables.  
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auditors are more sensitive to audit risk factors, measured using audit effort allocation, for busy 
season clients compared to non-busy season clients. The significant interaction coefficient on 
INV_REC*BUSY (p-value < 0.05) indicates that audit effort is incrementally higher when 
clients have high levels of inventory and receivables. This suggests that the auditors more 
sensitive to audit risk factors, measured using audit effort allocation, for busy season clients 
compared to non-busy season clients.  
4.4.2 Financial Risk  
 As it relates to financial risk, auditor effort is higher for clients experiencing a loss 
(LOSS, p-value < 0.05), and high leverage (LEVERAGE, p-value < 0.01). The coefficient on 
CASH is negative and significant, however, the coefficient on the interaction of CASH*BUSY 
and the joint-test of CASH + CASH*BUSY is insignificant, suggesting auditors are sensitive to 
the ratio of cash to total assets for non-busy season clients, but there is not a significant 
difference compared to busy season client.  
 The significant interaction coefficient on ROA*BUSY (p-value < 0.10) indicates that 
audit effort is incrementally higher when clients have low financial performance, suggesting that 
the auditors are more sensitive to audit risk factors, measured using audit effort allocation, for 
busy season clients compared to non-busy season clients.  
4.4.3 Litigation Risk  
Finally, as it relates to litigation risk, the coefficient on SIZE is positive and significant, 
which suggests that larger clients require more audit effort. In addition, the interaction between 
size and busy-season clients is not significant, suggesting that client size does not affect audit 
effort differently for busy season clients compared to non-busy season clients. The joint test of 
the sum of the coefficients of SIZE and the interaction of SIZE and BUSY is positive and 
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significant, suggesting that the effect of SIZE on audit effort also influences audit effort for busy 
season clients.  
 In summary, the majority of audit risks are important to the auditor for both busy-
season and non-busy-season clients (internal control weaknesses, NT filing, mergers and 
acquisitions, and complex accounting balances), and the only significant difference between 
busy season clients and non-busy season clients is the association between audit fees and 
earnings quality. The inverse relation between earnings quality and audit fees is consistent with 
prior literature.  Next, there seems to be no meaningful relation between auditor realignment and 
financial risk. Overall, in my main sample, there appears to be marginal evidence that auditor 
effort allocation is sensitive to concerns about resource constraints.11  
                                                 




5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Time-Period Analysis 
 In this section of the paper, I explore three different time periods: (1) the post-SOX 
period which spans the three years before the recession, 2004 through 2006; (2) the recession 
period which spans the three years during the recession, 2007 through 2009;12 and (3) the post-
recession period which spans the six years after the recession, 2010 through 2015. These three 
periods capture three different audit markets. During the post-SOX period, two years after SOX 
was implemented – audit firms were evaluating their risks and adjusting their client portfolios 
(Landsman et al., 2009). However, during the recession, audit firms were dealing with the risks 
of the financial crisis and the economic effects that were impacting their clients, possibly, 
affecting auditor business risk and client-continuance decisions. And last, based on discussions 
with audit partners at Global Six13 audit firms, the post-recession period was a different market 
for auditors because they were rebounding from the financial crisis, evaluating their client 
portfolio, and rebalancing their portfolio risks. 
5.1.1 Client continuance decisions 
5.1.1.1 Audit Risk 
 As it relates to audit risk, the probability of auditor switching is higher for clients with 
weak internal controls (ICOFR, p-value < 0.05) during the all three periods (2004-2015), annual 
financial statements filed after the statutory SEC deadline (NT_FILING, p-value < 0.1) during 
post-SOX and post-recession periods.  
                                                 
12 The National Bureau of Economic Research estimated that the most recent economic recession started December 
2007 and ended June 2009 (see http:www.nber.org/cycles.html). 
13 The Global Six audit firms include the Big Four (Deloitte, PWC, Ernst & Young, and KPMG) and the next two 
largest global accounting firms, Grant Thornton and McGladrey (Kuehner-Hebert, 2014). 
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In the post-SOX period, the probability of auditor continuance is incrementally lower for 
clients with a material weakness opinion over the financial reporting process (ICOFR*BUSY, p-
value < 0.01). However, in the recession and post-recession period, the probability of auditor 
continuance is incrementally lower for clients that do not meet the deadline for issuing the 
annual financial statements and must notify the SEC (NT_FILING*BUSY, p-value < 0.10). 
These results suggest that the auditor’s sensitivity to audit risk factors, measured using auditor-
client continuance decisions, is affected by resource constraints. However, the probability of an 
auditor switching is higher for clients with higher inventory, receivables and December year-
ends in the post-recession period, but the difference between busy season and non-busy season 
clients is not significant.  
5.1.1.2 Financial Risk 
 As it relates to financial risk, the probability of auditor client-continuance is lower for 
non-December year-end clients with weak financial performance (LOSS, p-value < 0.01) and 
higher for companies with low cash in the recession period (CASH, p-value < 0.10). In the post-
recession period (2010–2015), financial performance does impact the decision on whether to 
continue the auditor-client relationship for busy season clients (LOSS+LOSS*BUSY, p-value < 
0.05; CASH + CASH*BUSY, p-value < 0.05; ALTMAN_Z + ALTMAN_Z*BUSY, p-value < 
0.10) but there is no significant difference between busy season clients compared to non-busy 
season clients.  
Financial risks are important to the decision-making process. I find that, during the post-
SOX period, the probability of auditor client-continuance is lower (higher) for busy season 
clients with high (low) leverage compared to non-busy season clients (LEVERAGE*BUSY, p-
value < 0.05).  
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5.1.1.3 Litigation Risk 
 As it relates to litigation risk, the probability of client continuance is higher for clients 
with a high market-value of equity (SIZE, p-value < 0.01) in all periods (2004-2015). However, 
in the post-SOX period (2004-2006), the probability of client continuance is lower for clients 
with high market value for busy season clients compared to non-busy season client 
(SIZE*BUSY, p-value < 0.01) even though the probability of client continuance is higher for 
busy season clients with high market-value of equity compared to clients with low market value 
of equity. This suggests that auditors are more sensitive to their busy season clients’ litigation 
risk compared to their non-busy season clients.  
5.1.2 Audit Effort Allocation 
5.1.2.1 Audit Risk  
 As it relates to audit risk, auditor effort is higher for clients experiencing low revenue 
growth (REV_GROWTH, p-value < 0.01) and higher for clients with material weakness of 
internal controls (ICOFR, p-value <0.01), NT filings (NT_FILING, p-value<0.01), and mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A, p-value < 0.01), as well as with a high ratio of inventory and receivables 
(INV_REC, p-value < 0.01). The coefficient on the interaction of ABS_DA*BUSY is negative 
and significant in columns (2) and (3) (ABS_DA*BUSY, p-value < 0.01). This result suggests 
that the audit effort is incrementally higher when clients have a low absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. Auditors were more sensitive to audit risk factors, measured using audit 
effort allocation, for busy season clients relative to non-busy season clients in the post-SOX and 
recession periods. The coefficient on NT_FILING*BUSY is positive and significant in column 
(2) only, suggesting that auditors were more sensitive to clients filing their 10-K late 
(NT_FILING*BUSY) in the post-SOX period. This result may be driven by auditors waiting 
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longer to sign their opinion on the financial statements because they needed more time to address 
their concerns about the new regulation.  
5.1.2.2 Financial Risk  
 As it related to financial risk, audit effort is higher for clients that experienced a loss 
during the recession and post-recession periods; high leverage during the post-SOX, recession, 
and post-recession period; low cash during the post-SOX and post-recession period; and higher 
risk of bankruptcy during the post-recession period. None of the interaction terms are statistically 
significant (all p-values > 0.10), suggesting that the auditor’s sensitivity to financial risk factors, 
measured using audit effort allocation, does not significantly differ between busy season and 
non-busy season clients. 
5.1.2.3 Litigation Risk 
 As it relates to litigation risk, audit effort is higher for large clients (SIZE, p-value < 
0.01). In the column (4), the interaction term on SIZE*BUSY is positive and significant. This 
result suggests that auditors allocated more effort to large busy season clients than large non-
busy season client during the post-recession period.  
5.2 Big Four and non-Big Four 
According to a 2008 GAO study, 84% of publicly traded clients are audited by Big Four 
firms.14 The Big Four audit firms are inspected annually and are considered to provide higher 
quality audits than some of the smaller audit firms (Simunic, 1980). Furthermore, the client 
portfolios of the Big Four accounting firms differ from the portfolios of small accounting firms 
                                                 
14 My sample contains 74% of the clients audited by one of the Big Four audit firms. The difference between my 
sample and the 2008 GAO report may be due to fluctuations in Big Four market share over time and the fact that I 
eliminate clients from the highly regulated industries.  
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(Lopez and Peter, 2011). Thus, in this section, I estimate equations [1] and [3] for only Big Four 
audit firm client-continuance decisions.  
5.2.1 Client Continuance Decisions for Big Four and non-Big Four Clients 
In Table 10 and 11, I estimate equation [1] using only Big Four and non-Big Four 
auditor-client relationships, respectively. 
5.2.1.1 Audit Risk 
As it relates to audit risk, the probability of Big Four auditor client continuance is lower 
for clients with internal control weaknesses (ICOFR, p-value < 0.01) in columns (1) – (4) and 
late annual SEC filing status (NT_FILING, p-value < 0.01) in columns (1) and (4). These results 
provide limited evidence showing that effective internal controls are important to Big Four audit 
firms in all periods, whereas a client filing its annual financial statements late appears to be 
significant in the post-recession period. I find that auditors are more sensitive to the presence of 
internal control weaknesses for busy season clients compared to non-busy season clients for the 
entire sample period (ICOFR*BUSY, p-value < 0.05) and in the post-recession period (ICOFR, 
p-value < 0.10). These results suggest that clients with internal control weaknesses are costlier to 
audit and that it is not worth increasing the amount of audit effort to mitigate the risk of issuing 
an incorrect audit opinion.  
As with the results above, as it relates to audit risk, the probability of non-Big Four client 
continuance is lower for clients with material weakness over internal controls in columns (1) – 
(4) (ICOFR, p-value < 0.01) and non-timely annual financial statement filings in columns (1) - 
(3) (NT_FILING, p-value < 0.10). The significant interaction coefficient on NT_FILING*BUSY 
(p-value, < 0.05) in columns (1) and (2) indicates that the auditor is less likely to continue 
working with a busy season client that files its annual financial statements late compared to a 
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non-busy season client.  The significant interaction coefficient on M&A*BUSY (p-value < 0.10) 
in column (3) indicates that the auditor was less likely to continue working with busy season 
clients that experienced a merger or acquisition during the recession. This suggests that auditors 
are sensitive to audit risk factors, measured using client continuance decisions, for busy season 
clients compared to non-busy season client.   
5.2.1.2 Financial Risk 
As it relates to financial risk, the probability of auditor client-continuance is less likely 
for clients experiencing a loss (LOSS, p-value < 0.05), low cash (CASH, p-value <0.01), or a 
high likelihood of bankruptcy (ALTMAN_Z, p-value <0.05).  
The significant interaction coefficient on LEVERAGE*BUSY (p-value < 0.01) indicates 
that the probability of auditor client continuance is incrementally higher (lower) for clients with a 
high (low) debt to asset ratio, suggesting that the auditors’ sensitivity to financial factors, 
measuring client-continuance decisions, does significantly differ between busy season and non-
busy season clients. The joint test for the effect of LEVERAGE on busy season clients is positive 
and significant, suggesting that the effect of the ratio of debt-to-assets is significant for only busy 
season clients and not non-busy season clients.   
As it relates to financial risk, the probability of auditor client continuance is less likely for 
non-busy season clients with a high ratio of debt to total assets (LEVERAGE, p-value < 0.10). 
However, the joint test of LEVERAGE on busy season clients is insignificant, suggesting non-
Big Four auditors are only sensitive to non-busy season client financial risk. 
5.2.1.3 Litigation Risk 
As it relates to litigation risk, the probability of client continuance is more likely for busy 
season clients with high market-value of equity (SIZE, p-value < 0.05). However, Big Four 
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auditors are more sensitive to busy season litigation risk compared to non-busy season. The 
significant interaction coefficient on SIZE*BUSY indicates that the probability of client 
continuance is incrementally lower (higher) for clients with high market-values of equity. The 
joint test for the effect of SIZE on busy season clients is negative and significant, suggesting that 
the effect of the market-value of equity is not totally mitigated by auditor resource constraints.  
As it relates to litigation risk of non-Big Four auditors, the probability of client 
continuance is more likely for non-busy season clients with high market-value of equity. 
However, the significant interaction coefficient on SIZE*BUSY (p-value < 0.10) indicates that 
the probability of client continuance is incrementally lower (higher) for clients with high (low) 
market-value of equity, suggesting that auditors’ sensitivity to litigation risk factors, measured 
using client-continuance decisions, does significantly differ between busy season and non-busy 
season clients. The joint test for the effect of SIZE on busy season clients is insignificant, 
suggesting that the effect of the market-value of equity is significant for only non-busy season 
clients and not for busy season clients.  
In summary, it appears that the Big Four audit firms are more sensitive to audit risk 
(material weakness of internal controls over the financial reporting process), financial risk 
(leverage to asset ratio), and litigation risk (market-value of equity) of busy season clients 
compared to those of non-busy season clients. Although auditors are sensitive to audit and 
financial risk in the main analysis in Table 6, the Big Four are more sensitive to different busy 
season client risk factors compared to non-busy season clients.  
5.2.2 Audit Effort for Big Four and non-Big Four clients 
In Tables 12 and 13, I estimate equation [3] using only Big Four and non-Big Four 
auditor-client relationships, respectively. 
30 
 
5.2.2.1 Audit Risk 
 As it relates to audit risk, auditor effort is higher for Big Four clients with low revenue 
growth (REV_GROWTH, p-value < 0.01) and higher for clients with material weakness of 
internal controls (ICOFR, p-value < 0.01), NT filings (NT_FILING, p-value < 0.01), mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A, p-value < 0.01), and a high ratio of inventory and receivables to total 
assets (INV_REC, p-value <0.01). The coefficient on the interaction of ABS_DA*BUSY is 
negative and significant in column (1) – (3) (ABS_DA*BUSY, p-value < 0.10). These results 
suggest that the audit effort is incrementally higher when clients have a low absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. Thus, auditors are more sensitive to audit risk factors, measured using 
audit effort allocation, for busy season clients relative to non-busy season clients in the full 
sample, post-SOX and recession periods. The coefficient on the interaction of 
NT_FILING*BUSY (p-value < 0.10) is positive and significant in column (2), suggesting that 
auditors were more sensitive to clients filing their annual financial statement late during the post-
SOX period. This result may be driven by auditors waiting longer to sign their opinion on the 
financial statement because they needed more time to address their concerns. The coefficient on 
INV_REC*BUSY is positive and significant during the recession and post-recession period, 
suggesting that auditors’ allocation more resources to clients with a high ratio of inventory and 
receivables to total assets.  
5.2.2.2 Financial Risk 
As it relates to financial risk, auditor effort is higher for Big Four clients with weak 
financial performance in the post SOX period (ROA, p-value < 0.01), experiencing a loss in the 
full sample and post-SOX period (LOSS, p-value < 0.05), high leverage in all periods 
(LEVERAGE, p-value < 0.01); and with low cash in all periods (CASH, p-value < 0.10). The 
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significant interaction coefficient on ROA*BUSY is negative (p-value < 0.01) indicates that the 
audit effort is incrementally higher when clients have low returns on assets. This result suggests 
that auditors allocate more effort to clients with weak financial performance.  
5.2.2.3 Litigation Risk 
 As it relates to litigation risk, audit effort is higher for large Big Four clients (SIZE, p-
value <0.01). In the post-SOX period, the interaction term on SIZE*BUSY is positive and 
significant. This result suggests that auditor allocate more effort to large busy season clients than 
large non-busy season client. 
 In summary, it appears that the Big Four audit firms are more sensitive to busy season 
client audit risk (absolute value of discretionary accruals) compared to non-busy season clients. 
5.3 Client Continuance Decisions within 90 days of the Annual Filing  
Under common circumstances, auditors usually begin preliminary engagement activities 
at the beginning of the fiscal year, after the audit opinion is signed (Pacheco-Paredes, Rama, and 
Wheatley 2017). Before the quarterly financial review begins, the auditor must sign an 
engagement letter to either audit or review the interim financial statements (PCAOB AS 1301, 
par 6-7).15 It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that client-continuance decisions made during the 
preliminary procedures within 90 days of auditors issuing their audit opinion on the annual 
financial statements will be more closely related to the prior year’s financial statements. In this 
section, I estimate equation [1] with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the auditor-client 
relationship ended no more than 90 days after the audit report was signed.  
                                                 
15 To estimate the time-period when an auditor would discontinue working with a client based on the prior year’s 
financial statement audit, I estimate the number of days between the date the auditor signs the audit opinion and the 
quarterly financial statement review deadline. Quarterly financial statements deadlines are 40 to 45 days after the 
quarter-end. Publicly traded clients have 60 to 90 days to file their annual financial statements (Form 10-K) which 




In Tables 13 and 14, I estimate equation [1] using SWITCH_90 as the dependent 
variable. 
5.3.1.1 Audit Risk 
 As it relates to audit risk, the probability of client continuance is lower for clients with 
internal control weaknesses (ICOFR, p-value < 0.05) in columns (1) – (4), and late annual SEC 
filing status (NT_FILING, p-value < 0.05) in columns (1), (3), and (4). The coefficient on the 
interaction NT_FILING*BUSY is positive and significant in column (3). These results suggest 
that during the recession, auditors were more sensitive to risks associated with filing the 10-K 
late.  
5.3.1.2 Financial Risk 
 As it relates to financial risk, the probability of auditor client-continuance is lower for 
clients experiencing a loss (LOSS, p-value < 0.10). The significant interaction coefficient on 
LEVERAGE*BUSY (p-value < 0.10) in column (2) indicates that the auditor is less likely to 
continue working with a client with high leverage. This result suggests that auditors were more 
sensitive to financial risk of busy season clients compared to non-busy season clients during the 
post-SOX period.  
5.3.1.3 Litigation Risk 
 As it relates to litigation risk, the probability of client continuance is higher for large 
clients (SIZE, p-value < 0.01) but lower for clients in highly litigious industries in the full 
sample (LIT_RISK, p-value < 0.10). The significant interaction coefficient on SIZE*BUSY is 
positive and significant in column (1) – (3) (SIZE*BUSY, p-value < 0.05) indicating that the 
auditor is more sensitive to clients with high market-value of equity, measured using client 
continuance decision, for busy season clients compared to non-busy season clients. This result 
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suggests that auditors are more sensitive to busy season litigation risk compared to non-busy 
season clients.  
5.4 Change in Risk Factors 
To allow for tests in which I investigate the effects of resource constraints and 
determinants of client continuance vary based on unanticipated risks (e.g., changes to risky 
account balances, changes in financial performance, new internal control weaknesses), I estimate 
a changes model to address the serial correlation of risk factors over time to identify expected vs. 
unexpected risk. For all continuous variables, I calculated the change from t − 1 to t. However, 
for the indicator variables, simply identifying a change from year t − 1 to year t does not capture 
whether the company changed from a 1 in year t − 1 to a 0 in year t or vice versa. Therefore, I 
create two variables for each indicator variable that identifies when the value switched from a 1 
in year t − 1 to 0 in year t or 0 in year t – 1 to 1 in year t, and 0 otherwise. I do not make 
predictions for the variables that change from 1 in year t – 1 to 0 in year t. Additionally, I do not 
interpret the coefficients on LIT_RISK because it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a client is 
in a highly litigious industry which means it is time-invariant and not any different from the prior 
models.  
5.4.1 Client Continuance and Change in Risk Factors 
In Tables 15 and 16, I estimate equation [1] using SWITCH as the dependent variable 
with a changes model. 
5.4.1.1 Audit Risk 
 As it relates to changes in audit risk, in the full sample, the probability of client 
continuance is higher for clients with a new internal control weakness (Δ_ICOFR_0_1, p-value < 
0.01), and NT filing in year t (Δ_NT_FILING_0_1, p-value < 0.05). The significant interaction 
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on Δ_ICOFR_1_0 (p-value < 0.05) indicates that the probability of client continuance is 
incrementally lower for clients with improvements in their internal controls over the financial 
reporting process. The significant interaction coefficient on Δ_NT_FILING_0_1*BUSY (p-value 
< 0.10) indicates that the probability of client continuance is incrementally lower for clients that 
file their financial statements late in the current year but not the prior year. These results suggest 
that the auditors’ sensitivity to changes in audit risk factors, measured using auditor client-
continuance decisions, does significantly differ between busy season and non-busy season 
clients.  
5.4.1.2 Financial Risk 
 As it relates to financial risk, the probability of auditor client-continuance is lower for 
companies experiencing a loss in year t while recognizing a gain in year t − 1 (Δ_LOSS_0_1, p-
value < 0.01), or an increased risk of bankruptcy (Δ_ALTMAN_Z, p-value < 0.10). In the full 
sample period, I find that none of the interaction terms are statistically significant (all p-values > 
0.01), suggesting that the auditor’s sensitivity to financial risk factors, measured using auditor 
client-continuance decisions, does not significantly differ between busy season and non-busy 
season clients.  
5.4.1.2 Litigation Risk 
 As it relates to litigation risk, in the full sample, the probability of auditor client-
continuance is not affected by changes in the market value of equity (SIZE, p-value > 0.01). I 
find that none of the interaction terms are statistically significant (all p-values > 0.01), suggesting 
that auditors’ sensitivity to changes in litigation risk factors, measured using auditor-client 




5.4.2 Changes in Audit Effort and Changes in Risk Factors 
In Tables 17 and 18, I estimate equation [3] using Δ_LN_AUDFEE as the dependent 
variable with a changes model. 
5.4.1.1 Audit Risk 
 As it relates to changes in audit risk, during the full sample, audit effort allocation is 
higher for clients with a new internal control weakness (Δ_ICOFR_0_1, p-value < 0.01), and 
with an NT filing in year t (Δ_NT_FILING_0_1, p-value < 0.05), and a new merger and 
acquisition in year t (M&A, p-value<0.01).  The significant interaction on Δ_ICOFR_1_0 (p-
value < 0.05) indicates that the probability of auditor client-continuance is incrementally lower 
for clients with improvements in their internal controls over the financial reporting process. This 
suggests that auditors are sensitive to changes in audit risk factors, measured using audit effort 
allocation, for busy season clients compared to non-busy season clients.  
5.4.1.2 Financial Risk 
 As it relates to financial risk, additional audit effort is allocated to companies 
experiencing decreased financial performance (Δ_ROA, p-value < 0.05), increased leverage 
(Δ_LEVERAGE, p-value < 0.01), and decreased cash (Δ_CASH, p-value < 0.01). In the full 
sample period, none of the interaction terms are statistically significant (all p-values > 0.10), 
suggesting that the auditors’ sensitivity to changes in financial risk factors, measured using 
auditor continuance decisions, does not significantly differ between busy season and non-busy 
season clients.  
5.4.1.2 Litigation Risk 
 As it relates to litigation risk, in the full sample, audit effort allocation increases when the 
market-value of equity increases (Δ_SIZE, p-value < 0.01). I find that none of the interaction 
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terms are statistically significant (all p-values > 0.01), suggesting that auditors’ sensitivity to 
changes in litigation risk factors, measured using audit effort allocation, does not significantly 





This paper examines auditor client-continuance decisions when resources are constrained. 
Auditors should be careful with the risk composition of their auditor’s client-portfolio. Prior 
research suggests that clients’ risk characteristics (i.e., audit, financial, and litigation risks) are 
the primary factors influencing auditor client-continuance decisions. However, when resources 
are constrained, these risks could cause incremental effects on the likelihood that the auditor–
client relationship continues.  
I examine the factors influencing auditor client-continuance using a sample of auditor-
client engagement observations. My results suggest that, in some instances, auditors are more 
sensitive to risks when their resources are constrained. However, for many factors, I find no 
difference in client continuance decisions between busy season and non-busy season clients. This 
result is not surprising, because auditors choose clients with certain risks in mind and do not 
make drastic shifts in their risk preferences on an annual basis. Thus, my study does not provide 
stark evidence of risk preferences held by auditors; however, I have shown that there is not a 
significant difference between client-continuance decisions for auditors with resource constraints 
when auditing December year-end clients.  
I acknowledge that prior work suggests that auditor switching is less likely for December 
year-end clients due to switching costs (Lopez and Peters, 2011). However, this study provides 
evidence that there is little-to-no difference between the sensitivity of auditor risk for December 
year-end clients over non-December year-end clients. Furthermore, in the additional analysis, I 
provide evidence that, during certain time periods, auditors are more sensitive to risk for busy-
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Variable  Source Definition 
Dependent Variables:     
SWITCH Audit Analytics 1 if an auditor-client engagement is discontinued, 
and, 0 otherwise 
SWITCH_90 Audit Analytics 1 if an auditor-client engagement is discontinued 
within 90 days of issuing the auditor's opinion; 
LN_AUDFEE Audit Analytics natural log of total audit fees; 
Δ_LN_AUDFEE Audit Analytics is calculated as the change in the log value of 
audit fee; 
Variable of Interest:     
BUSY Audit Analytics 1 if the client has a December year-end, and 0 
otherwise; 
Determinants :   
ABS_DA Compustat Absolute value of performance adjusted 
discretionary accruals (see Kothari et al. 2005); 
REV_GROWTH Compustat change in total revenues scaled by total assets; 
ICOFR Audit Analytics 
1 if the company reported a disclosure controls 
weakness in Section 302 or 404 report during the 
current year, 0 otherwise; 
NT_FILING Audit Analytics 
1 if the company filed a Form NT 10-K (non-
timely) to notify the SEC that the 10-K will be 
late. 
M&A Compustat 
1 if a company experience significant merger and 
acquisition activity during the current or the last 
year, and 0 otherwise; 
INV_REC Compustat ratio of inventory plus receivables to total assets; 
ROA Compustat net income before extraordinary items divided by 
average total assets; 
LOSS Compustat 1 if a company suffered a loss during the current, 
and 0 otherwise; 





Determinants :   
CASH Compustat ratio of cash to total assets; 
ALTMAN_Z (a measure of financial 
risk 
Compustat 
Estimated using the coefficients 
obtained from Shumway (2001) as 
follows:  
1.2(CA-CL)/TA + 0.6(RE/TA) + 
10(EBITA) + 0.05(MVE/TL) - 
0.47(SALES/TA) 
where:  
CA = Current Assets (ACT) 
CL = Current Liabilities (LCT); 
TA = Total assets (AT); 
RE = Retained earnings (RE); 
EBITA = Earnings before interest 
and tax dividend by total assets 
(EBIT/AT); 
MVE = Market value of equity 
(CSHO * PRCC_F); 
TL = Total liabilities (LT); 
SALES = Total revenue (REVT); 
SIZE Compustat Natural log of the market value of 
equity (CSHO*PRCC_F); 
LIT_RISK Compustat 
1 if the company is included in a 
high-risk industry as defined by 
Matsumoto (2002), and 0 
otherwise. High-risk industries are 
defined as firms with SIC codes in 
the following industries: 2833-
2836 (biotechnology); 3570-3577 
and 7370-7374 (computers); 
3600-3674 (electronics); and 
5200-5961 (retailing); 
BIG_4 Audit Analytics 
1 if the client is audited by a Big 4 
audit firm; 
Δ_ABS_DA Compustat is calculated as the change in 
absolute discretionary accruals; 
Δ_REV_GROWTH Compustat is calculated as the change in the 
ratio of revenue growth; 
Δ_ICOFR_1_0 Audit Analytics 
1 if the company reported a 
disclosure controls weakness in 
Section 302 or 404 report during 
the previous year and not in the 
current year, 0 otherwise; 
Δ_ICOFR_0_1 Audit Analytics 
1 if the company reported a 
disclosure controls weakness in 
Section 302 or 404 report during 
the current year but not in the 




Determinants :   
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0 Audit Analytics 
1 if the company filed a Form NT 10-K (non-
timely) in the previous year but not in the current 
year; 
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1 Audit Analytics 
1 if the company filed a Form NT 10-K (non-
timely) in the current year but not in the previous 
year; 
Δ_M&A_1_0 Compustat 
1 if a company experience significant merger and 
acquisition activity during the previous year but 
not in the current year, and 0 otherwise; 
Δ_M&A_0_1 Compustat 
1 if a company experience significant merger and 
acquisition activity during the current year but 
not in the previous year, and 0 otherwise; 
Δ_INV_REC Compustat is calculated as the change in the ratio of 
inventory and receivables to cash 
Δ_ROA Compustat is calculated as the change in the return on assets; 
Δ_LOSS_1_0 Compustat 
1 if a company suffered a loss during the current 
or the prior year but not during the current year, 
and 0 otherwise; 
Δ_LOSS_0_1 Compustat 
1 if a company suffered a loss during the current 
or the current year but not during the prior year, 
and 0 otherwise; 
Δ_LEVERAGE Compustat is calculated as the change in the ratio of debt to 
total assets; 
Δ_CASH Compustat is calculated as the change in the ratio of cash to 
total assets; 
Δ_ALTMAN_Z Compustat is calculated as the change in the Altman Z score; 
Δ_SIZE Compustat is calculated as the change in the natural log of 



















Sample construction criteria 
Sample
Compustat beginning sample (2004 - 2015) 111,861
Less: 
Partial years (255)
Missing Audit Analytics identifier (AUDITOR_FKEY) (23,152)
Auditor-Client engagements with fewer than 1 million in assets (17,625)
Auditor-Client engagement observations in Regulated industries (6000-6999, 4000-4999) (22,261)
Auditor-Client engagement observations with requisite data to construct independent variables (16,729)
Final Sample 31,839
Auditor-Company engagement observations in prior draft 29,629










2004 1,964 246 2,210 11.1%
2005 2,474 224 2,698 8.3%
2006 2,754 195 2,949 6.6%
2007 2,857 161 3,018 5.3%
2008 2,466 120 2,586 4.6%
2009 2,486 113 2,599 4.3%
2010 2,630 95 2,725 3.5%
2011 2,566 103 2,669 3.9%
2012 2,490 112 2,602 4.3%
2013 2,500 142 2,642 5.4%
2014 2,485 140 2,625 5.3%
2015 2,373 143 2,516 5.7%
Total 30,045 1,794 31,839 5.6%
SWITCH
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of the 





        Panel A: Full Sample (N = 31,839) 
Variable Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
SWITCH 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SWITCH_90 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LN_AUDFEES 13.74 1.28 10.90 12.88 13.75 14.54 17.04 
BUSY 0.67 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ABS_DA 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.44 
REV_GROWTH 0.07 0.22 -0.76 -0.01 0.06 0.16 0.82 
ICOFR 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NT_FILING 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
M&A 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
INV_REC 0.25 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.23 0.36 0.78 
ROA 0.03 0.30 -1.75 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.45 
LOSS 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LEVERAGE 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.28 0.68 
CASH 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.37 0.97 
ALTMAN_Z 0.95 3.43 -17.42 0.54 1.72 2.65 5.91 
SIZE 9.15 3.13 2.63 7.10 8.92 11.01 17.95 
LIT_RISK 0.21 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
BIG4 0.74 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Note: See Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 




TABLE 3 (continued) 
Summary Statistics 
 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles.  
  
Panel B: Change Variables
Variable Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Δ_LN_AUDFEE 0.05 0.33 -2.80 -0.08 0.02 0.14 4.38
Δ_ABS_DA 0.00 0.11 -0.48 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.44
Δ_REV_GROWTH -0.01 0.28 -1.08 -0.11 -0.01 0.08 1.03
Δ_ICOFR_1_0 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Δ_ICOFR_0_1 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Δ_M&A_1_0 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Δ_M&A_0_1 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Δ_INV_REC 0.00 0.06 -0.23 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.17
Δ_ROA 0.02 0.27 -0.90 -0.04 0.00 0.04 1.74
Δ_LOSS_1_0 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Δ_LOSS_0_1 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Δ_LEVERAGE 0.00 0.09 -0.38 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.33
Δ_CASH 0.00 0.10 -0.36 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.38
Δ_ALTMAN_Z 0.00 1.39 -5.46 -0.33 0.01 0.28 7.62
Δ_SIZE 0.14 0.59 -1.95 -0.06 0.08 0.25 2.65
52 
 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
Summary Statistics 
 
*, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, 
respectively, using a T-test for comparison of mean values for continuous variables and chi-
squared test for comparison of dichotomous variables. See Table 1 for variable definitions. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the sample.  
  
Panel C: Univariate Statistics
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
Test of 
Differences
SWITCH 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 *
SWITCH_90 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00
LN_AUDFEES 13.77 14.56 13.66 13.70 ***
ABS_DA 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.04 ***
REV_GROWTH 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.06 **
MW 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00
NT_FILING 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 ***
M&A 0.38 1.00 0.40 0.00 **
INV_REC 0.23 0.33 0.30 0.27 ***
ROA -0.05 0.09 0.01 0.05 ***
LOSS 0.36 1.00 0.28 0.00 ***
LEVERAGE 0.18 0.30 0.15 0.11 ***
CASH 0.26 0.40 0.22 0.15 ***
ALTMAN_Z 0.65 2.43 1.55 2.16 ***
SIZE 9.24 11.07 8.96 8.86 ***
LIT_RISK 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.00 ***












See Table 1 for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the sample.   
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
SWITCH (1) 1
DEC_YE (2) -0.01 1
ABS_DA (3) 0.03 0.06 1
REV_GROWTH (4) -0.01 0.01 0.11 1
ICOFR (5) 0.14 -0.01 0.09 0.01 1
NT_FILING (6) 0.13 -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.40 1
M&A (7) -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.10 -0.03 -0.01 1
INV_REC (8) 0.03 -0.17 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.02 1
ROA (9) -0.04 -0.09 -0.22 0.16 -0.08 -0.08 0.17 0.24 1
LOSS (10) 0.07 0.08 0.13 -0.24 0.12 0.11 -0.19 -0.18 -0.60 1
LEVERAGE (11) -0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.06 -0.02 1
CASH (12) 0.00 0.08 0.13 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.25 -0.41 -0.41 0.31 -0.43 1
ALTMAN_Z (13) -0.04 -0.12 -0.13 0.17 -0.06 -0.05 0.17 0.34 0.62 -0.52 0.08 -0.41 1
SIZE (14) -0.10 0.04 -0.20 -0.01 -0.13 -0.13 0.29 -0.14 0.27 -0.30 0.17 -0.24 0.26 1
LIT_RISK (15) 0.00 -0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.11 -0.04 0.03 -0.10 0.16 -0.04 -0.01 1





Resource Constraints and Determinants of Auditor Client-Continuance Decisions 
Main Multivariate Analysis 
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Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -0.355 (0.181)
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + -0.017 (0.513) 1.145 (0.000) *** 1.081 (0.018) **
REV_GROWTH + -0.160 (0.191) 0.008 (0.478) -0.034 (0.568)
ICOFR + 0.796 (0.000) *** 0.804 (0.000) *** 0.882 (0.000) ***
NT_FILING + 0.451 (0.000) *** 0.615 (0.000) *** 0.506 (0.001) ***
M&A + 0.029 (0.388) 0.144 (0.022) ** 0.077 (0.243)
INV_REC + -0.004 (0.494) 0.070 (0.387) 0.309 (0.178)
ABS_DA*BUSY + 0.252 (0.342)
REV_GROWTH*BUSY + 0.115 (0.311)
ICOFR*BUSY + 0.139 (0.179)
NT_FILING*BUSY + 0.266 (0.050) **
M&A*BUSY + -0.059 (0.684)
INV_REC*BUSY + -0.271 (0.197)
Financial Risk
ROA - -0.053 (0.387) 0.054 (0.665) 0.161 (0.478)
LOSS + 0.326 (0.002) *** 0.016 (0.423) 0.245 (0.036) **
LEVERAGE + -0.220 (0.216) 0.032 (0.434) -0.082 (0.791)
CASH - -0.327 (0.890) -0.215 (0.888) 0.166 (0.573)






TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
 (Continued on the next page) 
 
  
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
ROA*BUSY - 0.259 (0.245)
LOSS*BUSY + -0.062 (0.650)
LEVERAGE*BUSY + 0.125 (0.712)
CASH*BUSY - -0.111 (0.720)
ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - -0.017 (0.325)
Litigation Risk
SIZE - -0.157 (0.000) *** -0.125 (0.000) *** -0.114 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + 0.083 (0.521) -0.002 (0.509) 0.201 (0.110)
SIZE*BUSY + 0.047 (0.024) **
LIT_RISK*BUSY + 0.100 (0.489)
Constant -0.691 (0.142) -0.512 (0.318) -3.146 (0.002) ***
Observations 31,839 21,368 10,312
Number of Switches 1,794 1,175 619




Year FE Yes Yes Yes




Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equations [1] and [2]. Column 1 represents a 
logistic regression model examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the 
relation between the determinants of client continuance and auditor client-continuance decisions, 
SWITCH. Column 2 and 3 represent logistic regression models examining the relation between the 
determinants of client continuance and auditor client-continuance decisions, SWITCH for busy 
season and non-busy season clients, respectively.  P-values reported in parentheses are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-
tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All 










Panel B: Joint Tests of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum χ2 p-val
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + ABS_DA*BUSY 0.235 0.48 (0.487)
REV_GROWTH + REV_GROWTH*BUSY -0.045 0.09 (0.761)
ICOFR + ICOFR*BUSY 0.935 112.35 (0.000) ***
NT_FILING + NT_FILING*BUSY 0.717 52.21 (0.000) ***
M&A + M&A*BUSY -0.030 0.26 (0.877)
INV_REC + INV_REC*BUSY -0.275 1.34 (0.247)
Financial Risk
ROA + ROA*BUSY 0.206 2.66 (0.103)
LOSS + LOSS*BUSY 0.264 10.90 (0.001) ***
LEVERAGE + LEVERAGE*BUSY -0.095 0.23 (0.631)
CASH + CASH*BUSY -0.438 6.25 (0.012) **
ALTMAN_Z + ALTMAN_Z*BUSY -0.013 1.47 (0.225)
Litigation Risk
SIZE + SIZE*BUSY -0.110 78.20 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + LIT_RISK*BUSY 0.183 3.48 (0.062) *
Notes: Panel B presents the results from the Wald chi-squared tests for all 
determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the 
coefficients on the determinant and interaction term differ from zero. *, **, *** 
Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, 
<0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All variables 




Audit Effort and the Determinants of Auditor Client-Continuance Decisions 
Main Multivariate Analysis 
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Panel A: Ordinary Least Square Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY 0.005 (0.953)
Audit Risk
ABS_DA - -0.327 (0.003) *** -0.494 (0.000) *** -0.304 (0.005) ***
REV_GROWTH - -0.206 (0.000) *** -0.23 (0.000) *** -0.202 (0.000) ***
ICOFR + 0.259 (0.000) *** 0.272 (0.000) *** 0.309 (0.000) ***
NT_FILING + 0.196 (0.000) *** -0.309 (1.000) 0.0346 (0.286)
M&A + 0.151 (0.000) *** 0.158 (0.000) *** 0.143 (0.000) ***
INV_REC + 0.686 (0.000) *** 0.885 (0.000) *** 0.729 (0.000) ***
ABS_DA*BUSY - -0.220 (0.064) *
REV_GROWTH*BUSY + -0.005 (0.544)
ICOFR*BUSY + -0.128 (0.992)
NT_FILING*BUSY + 0.018 (0.385)
M&A*BUSY + 0.010 (0.359)
INV_REC*BUSY + 0.197 (0.048) **
Financial Risk
ROA - 0.112 (0.894) -0.012 (0.775) 0.097 (0.274)
LOSS + 0.070 (0.007) *** 0.077 (0.000) *** 0.0677 (0.018) **
LEVERAGE + 1.077 (0.000) *** 0.957 (0.000) *** 1.112 (0.000) ***
CASH - -0.164 (0.034) ** -0.097 (0.081) * -0.143 (0.132)






TABLE 6 (continued) 
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
ROA*BUSY - -0.141 (0.077) *
LOSS*BUSY + -0.008 (0.589)
LEVERAGE*BUSY + -0.105 (0.836)
CASH*BUSY - 0.085 (0.804)
ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - 0.01 (0.942)
Litigation Risk
SIZE + 0.340 (0.000) *** 0.327 (0.000) *** 0.341 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + -0.101 (0.983) -0.104 (0.999) -0.105 (0.041) **
SIZE*BUSY + -0.004 (0.695)
LIT_RISK*BUSY + -0.011 (0.591)
Constant 9.920 (0.000) *** 12.000 (0.000) *** 8.536 (0.000) ***




Year FE Yes Yes Yes




Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equations [1] and [2]. Column 1 represents an 
ordinary least squares regression model examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) 
effect the relation between the determinants of client continuance and auditor effort allocation, 
LN_AUDFEE. Column 2 and 3 represent ordinary least square regression models examining the 
relation between the determinants of client continuance and auditor effort allocation, LN_AUDFEE 
for busy season and non-busy season clients, respectively.  P-values reported in parentheses are 
based on robust standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at 
one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) 
made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
  
Panel B: Joint Tests of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum F -test p-val
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + ABS_DA*BUSY -0.55 50.11 (0.000) ***
REV_GROWTH + REV_GROWTH*BUSY -0.21 55.62 (0.000) ***
ICOFR + ICOFR*BUSY 0.13 17.76 (0.000) ***
NT_FILING + NT_FILING*BUSY 0.21 34.01 (0.000) ***
M&A + M&A*BUSY 0.16 126.79 (0.000) ***
INV_REC + INV_REC*BUSY 0.88 98.09 (0.000) ***
Financial Risk
ROA + ROA*BUSY -0.03 0.50 (0.481)
LOSS + LOSS*BUSY 0.06 10.42 (0.001) ***
LEVERAGE + LEVERAGE*BUSY 0.97 250.67 (0.000) ***
CASH + CASH*BUSY -0.08 2.12 (0.145)
ALTMAN_Z + ALTMAN_Z*BUSY 0.00 1.00 (0.318)
Litigation Risk
SIZE + SIZE*BUSY 0.336 5662.38 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + LIT_RISK*BUSY -0.112 11.91 (0.001) ***
Notes: Panel B presents the results from the F-test for all determinants and interaction 
terms. It examines whether the sum of the coefficients on the determinant and 
interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at 
one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction 




Auditor Client-Continuance Decisions - Time-Period Analysis 
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Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -1.414 (0.002) *** -0.038 (0.945) 0.273 (0.522)
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + -0.205 (0.592) -0.146 (0.553) 0.582 (0.252)
REV_GROWTH + -0.281 (0.834) -0.246 (0.739) -0.311 (0.831)
ICOFR + 0.540 (0.005) *** 0.954 (0.000) *** 1.057 (0.000) ***
NT_FILING + 0.424 (0.014) *** 0.289 (0.123) 0.473 (0.035) **
M&A + 0.184 (0.119) * -0.106 (0.696) -0.101 (0.712)
INV_REC + 0.460 (0.157) * -0.071 (0.551) -0.357 (0.780)
ABS_DA*BUSY + -0.070 (0.526) 0.296 (0.411) -0.012 (0.505)
REV_GROWTH*BUSY + -0.033 (0.534) 0.498 (0.143) 0.371 (0.175)
ICOFR*BUSY + 0.404 (0.053) ** -0.118 (0.654) -0.163 (0.749)
NT_FILING*BUSY + 0.165 (0.244) 0.452 (0.093) * 0.548 (0.039) **
M&A*BUSY + -0.203 (0.848) 0.301 (0.117) -0.039 (0.572)
INV_REC*BUSY + -0.131 (0.596) 0.303 (0.327) -0.577 (0.868)
Financial Risk
ROA - -0.001 (0.499) 0.116 (0.600) -0.063 (0.419)
LOSS + 0.237 (0.098) ** 0.536 (0.011) ** 0.249 (0.097) *
LEVERAGE + -0.587 (0.895) -0.070 (0.548) 0.026 (0.478)
CASH - 0.060 (0.556) -0.803 (0.082) * -0.430 (0.167)






TABLE 7 (continued) 
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Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
ROA*BUSY - 0.162 (0.655) -0.055 (0.460) 0.375 (0.860)
LOSS*BUSY + 0.001 (0.500) -0.233 (0.790) 0.026 (0.455)
LEVERAGE*BUSY + 1.073 (0.031) ** -0.186 (0.604) -0.418 (0.777)
CASH*BUSY - -0.166 (0.373) 0.719 (0.859) -0.272 (0.293)
ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - -0.020 (0.288) 0.023 (0.715) -0.017 (0.244)
Litigation Risk
SIZE - -0.212 (0.000) *** -0.110 (0.001) *** -0.130 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + -0.070 (0.640) 0.128 (0.327) 0.162 (0.226)
SIZE*BUSY + 0.125 (0.000) *** -0.025 (0.719) 0.017 (0.303)
LIT_RISK*BUSY + 0.123 (0.295) 0.074 (0.404) 0.127 (0.291)
Constant 0.059 (0.935) -0.140 (0.886) -2.441 (0.001) ***
Observations 7,823 7,972 15,705
Number of Switches 665 394 735




Year FE Yes Yes Yes




Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [1]. Columns 1 - 3 represent logistic 
regression models examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the relation 
between the determinants of client continuance and auditor client-continuance decisions, SWITCH 
during three separate time periods. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values 





TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Joint Tests of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val
Audit Risk
ABS_DA+ABS_DA*BUSY -0.693 17.89 (0.000) *** -0.78 31.93 (0.000) *** -0.423 19.76 (0.000) ***
REV_GROWTH+REV_GROWTH*BUSY -0.158 4.91 (0.027) ** -0.188 20.29 (0.000) *** -0.249 35.44 (0.000) ***
ICOFR+ICOFR*BUSY 0.307 40.57 (0.000) *** 0.176 8.94 (0.003) *** 0.02 0.22 (0.639)
NT_FILING+NT_FILING*BUSY 0.271 24.42 (0.000) *** 0.136 4.24 (0.040) ** 0.188 9.38 (0.002) ***
M&A+M&A*BUSY 0.102 20.33 (0.000) *** 0.159 71.96 (0.000) *** 0.18 96.72 (0.000) ***
INV_REC+INV_REC*BUSY 0.797 41.25 (0.000) *** 0.887 60.42 (0.000) *** 0.911 78.11 (0.000) ***
Financial Risk
ROA+ROA*BUSY -0.18 4.71 (0.030) ** -0.09 1.51 (0.220) 0.014 0.09 (0.766)
LOSS+LOSS*BUSY -0.02 0.22 (0.640) 0.04 1.43 (0.232) 0.093 14.52 (0.000) ***
LEVERAGE+LEVERAGE*BUSY 0.94 102.17 (0.000) *** 0.91 113.68 (0.000) *** 1.023 201.01 (0.000) ***
CASH+CASH*BUSY -0.10 1.46 (0.227) -0.07 1.03 (0.311) -0.072 1.21 (0.271)
ALTMAN_Z+ALTMAN_Z*BUSY 0.00 0.4 (0.528) 0.00 0.4 (0.525) 0.003 0.88 (0.349)
Litigation Risk
SIZE+SIZE*BUSY 0.344 3298.77 (0.000) *** 0.336 3663.55 (0.000) *** 0.334 4364.04 (0.000) ***





Notes: Panel B presents the results from the F -test for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the 
coefficients on the determinant and interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-




Audit Effort and Client-Continuance Decisions - Time-Periods Analysis  
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -0.116 (0.401) 0.101 (0.387) -0.0298 (0.781)
Audit Risk
ABS_DA - -0.104 (0.351) -0.306 (0.074) * -0.442 (0.001) ***
REV_GROWTH - -0.187 (0.033) ** -0.253 (0.000) *** -0.179 (0.000) ***
ICOFR + 0.549 (0.000) *** 0.260 (0.000) *** 0.108 (0.047) **
NT_FILING + 0.065 (0.184) 0.249 (0.000) *** 0.196 (0.020) **
M&A + 0.116 (0.004) *** 0.187 (0.000) *** 0.143 (0.000) ***
INV_REC + 0.766 (0.000) *** 0.662 (0.000) *** 0.678 (0.000) ***
ABS_DA*BUSY - -0.589 (0.030) ** -0.474 (0.030) ** 0.019 (0.546)
REV_GROWTH*BUSY + 0.029 (0.406) 0.065 (0.177) -0.070 (0.859)
ICOFR*BUSY + -0.242 (0.998) -0.084 (0.830) -0.088 (0.873)
NT_FILING*BUSY + 0.206 (0.012) ** -0.113 (0.877) -0.008 (0.527)
M&A*BUSY + -0.014 (0.609) -0.028 (0.755) 0.037 (0.136)
INV_REC*BUSY + 0.031 (0.429) 0.225 (0.070) * 0.233 (0.043) **
Financial Risk
ROA - 0.037 (0.585) 0.078 (0.690) 0.134 (0.908)
LOSS + 0.032 (0.315) 0.08 (0.034) ** 0.070 (0.028) **
LEVERAGE + 1.015 (0.000) *** 1.055 (0.000) *** 1.112 (0.000) ***
CASH - -0.215 (0.064) * 0.007 (0.523) -0.226 (0.015) **






TABLE 8 (continued) 
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
ROA*BUSY - -0.212 (0.871) -0.166 (0.168) -0.120 (0.142)
LOSS*BUSY + -0.051 (0.256) -0.045 (0.805) 0.023 (0.301)
LEVERAGE*BUSY + -0.071 (0.329) -0.149 (0.857) -0.089 (0.754)
CASH*BUSY - 0.112 (0.763) -0.08 (0.265) 0.154 (0.906)
ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - 0.004 (0.634) 0.007 (0.757) 0.012 (0.952)
Litigation Risk
SIZE + 0.323 (0.000) *** 0.340 (0.000) *** 0.341 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + -0.054 (0.193) -0.068 (0.890) -0.139 (0.994)
SIZE*BUSY + 0.021 (0.012) ** -0.004 (0.693) -0.007 (0.820)
LIT_RISK*BUSY + -0.067 (0.151) -0.070 (0.886) 0.0408 (0.238)
Constant 9.417 (0.000) *** 10.44 (0.000) *** 10.12 (0.000) ***




Year FE Yes Yes Yes




Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [3]. Columns 1 - 3 represent ordinary least 
squares regression models examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the relation 
between the determinants of client continuance and auditor effort allocation, LN_AUDFEE during three 
separate time periods. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by 
client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, 






TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Joint Tests of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val
Audit Risk
ABS_DA+ABS_DA*BUSY -0.693 17.89 (0.000) *** -0.78 31.93 (0.000) *** -0.423 19.76 (0.000) ***
REV_GROWTH+REV_GROWTH*BUSY -0.158 4.91 (0.027) ** -0.188 20.29 (0.000) *** -0.249 35.44 (0.000) ***
ICOFR+ICOFR*BUSY 0.307 40.57 (0.000) *** 0.176 8.94 (0.003) *** 0.02 0.22 (0.639)
NT_FILING+NT_FILING*BUSY 0.271 24.42 (0.000) *** 0.136 4.24 (0.040) ** 0.188 9.38 (0.002) ***
M&A+M&A*BUSY 0.102 20.33 (0.000) *** 0.159 71.96 (0.000) *** 0.18 96.72 (0.000) ***
INV_REC+INV_REC*BUSY 0.797 41.25 (0.000) *** 0.887 60.42 (0.000) *** 0.911 78.11 (0.000) ***
Financial Risk
ROA+ROA*BUSY -0.18 4.71 (0.030) ** -0.09 1.51 (0.220) 0.014 0.09 (0.766)
LOSS+LOSS*BUSY -0.02 0.22 (0.640) 0.04 1.43 (0.232) 0.093 14.52 (0.000) ***
LEVERAGE+LEVERAGE*BUSY 0.94 102.17 (0.000) *** 0.91 113.68 (0.000) *** 1.023 201.01 (0.000) ***
CASH+CASH*BUSY -0.10 1.46 (0.227) -0.07 1.03 (0.311) -0.072 1.21 (0.271)
ALTMAN_Z+ALTMAN_Z*BUSY 0.00 0.4 (0.528) 0.00 0.4 (0.525) 0.003 0.88 (0.349)
Litigation Risk
SIZE+SIZE*BUSY 0.344 3298.77 (0.000) *** 0.336 3663.55 (0.000) *** 0.334 4364.04 (0.000) ***







Notes: Panel B presents the results from the F -test for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the 
coefficients on the determinant and interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-





Auditor Client-Continuance Decisions - Big Four Analysis 
 
  
(Continued on the next page) 
  
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
VARIABLES Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -1.446 (0.000) *** -2.192 (0.000) *** -0.418 (0.649) -0.950 (0.150)
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + -0.308 (0.664) 0.335 (0.366) 0.699 (0.316) -0.878 (0.687)
REV_GROWTH + -0.513 (0.980) -0.728 (0.977) -0.533 (0.841) -0.476 (0.855)
ICOFR + 0.730 (0.000) *** 0.564 (0.015) ** 1.151 (0.001) *** 0.835 (0.007) ***
NT_FILING + 0.590 (0.001) *** 0.547 (0.015) ** -0.117 (0.611) 1.194 (0.001) ***
M&A + 0.105 (0.186) 0.146 (0.198) 0.004 (0.494) 0.064 (0.385)
INV_REC + 0.381 (0.145) 0.535 (0.163) 0.514 (0.259) 0.192 (0.384)
ABS_DA*BUSY + -0.037 (0.517) -0.490 (0.651) -0.836 (0.671) 0.369 (0.426)
REV_GROWTH*BUSY + 0.268 (0.195) 0.545 (0.128) 0.017 (0.490) 0.361 (0.259)
ICOFR*BUSY + 0.460 (0.015) ** 0.539 (0.038) ** 0.232 (0.302) 0.353 (0.185)
NT_FILING*BUSY + -0.030 (0.449) 0.019 (0.476) 0.535 (0.165) -0.325 (0.746)
M&A*BUSY + -0.161 (0.864) -0.215 (0.834) 0.215 (0.252) -0.220 (0.802)
INV_REC*BUSY + -0.383 (0.819) -0.061 (0.538) -0.173 (0.570) -0.956 (0.910)
Financial Risk
ROA - -0.039 (0.449) 0.092 (0.577) 0.101 (0.589) -0.300 (0.293)
LOSS + 0.342 (0.008) *** 0.299 (0.080) * 0.558 (0.041) ** 0.169 (0.269)
LEVERAGE + -0.919 (0.994) -0.954 (0.960) -0.077 (0.540) -1.173 (0.957)
CASH - -0.894 (0.007) *** -0.616 (0.116) -1.456 (0.037) ** -0.881 (0.082) *
ALTMAN_Z - -0.036 (0.018) ** -0.034 (0.136) -0.049 (0.127) -0.044 (0.065) *
(2004-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH
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(Continued on the next page) 
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
ROA*BUSY - -0.039 (0.904) 0.092 (0.804) 0.101 (0.440) -0.300 (0.886)
LOSS*BUSY + 0.00136 (0.497) 0.067 (0.403) -0.308 (0.780) 0.187 (0.274)
LEVERAGE*BUSY + 1.132 (0.004) *** 1.743 (0.004) *** -0.498 (0.701) 1.135 (0.069) *
CASH*BUSY - 0.306 (0.769) 0.231 (0.648) 1.401 (0.928) -0.0901 (0.449)
ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - -0.013 (0.271) -0.011 (0.389) 0.035 (0.746) -0.0213 (0.266)
Litigation Risk
SIZE - -0.254 (0.000) *** -0.28 (0.000) *** -0.169 (0.003) *** -0.244 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + -0.002 (0.505) -0.135 (0.719) 0.389 (0.163) -0.041 (0.554)
SIZE*BUSY + 0.124 (0.000) *** 0.164 (0.000) *** 0.019 (0.399) 0.114 (0.020) **
LIT_RISK*BUSY + 0.108 (0.282) 0.200 (0.231) -0.273 (0.744) 0.187 (0.282)
Constant -0.294 (0.793) 1.721** (0.019) 1.342 (0.274) -0.454 (0.639)
Observations 23,652 6,282 5,544 11,386
Number of Switches 1,169 516 216 437
Area Under ROC 0.7353 0.7336 0.7474 0.7215
Pseudo R
2
0.1043 0.1138 0.1005 0.0827
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2004-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [1].Columns 1 - 4 represent logistic regression models examining 
whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the relation between the determinants of client continuance and auditor 
client-continuance decisions, SWITCH for Big Four auditor-client relationships. P-values reported in parentheses are based 
on robust standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, 
<0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
Panel B: Joint Tests of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + ABS_DA*BUSY -0.345 0.48 (0.486) -0.155 0.03 (0.852) -0.137 0.01 (0.912) -0.509 0.46 (0.498)
REV_GROWTH + REV_GROWTH*BUSY -0.245 1.55 (0.214) -0.183 0.34 (0.562) -0.516 1.62 (0.203) -0.115 0.12 (0.729)
ICOFR + ICOFR*BUSY 1.19 109.22 (0.000) *** 1.103 49.28 (0.000) *** 1.383 27.85 (0.000) *** 1.188 33.67 (0.000) ***
NT_FILING + NT_FILING*BUSY 0.56 16.49 (0.000) *** 0.566 10.84 (0.001) *** 0.418 1.34 (0.248) 0.869 9.9 (0.002) ***
M&A + M&A*BUSY -0.056 1.20 (0.548) -0.069 0.96 (0.617) 0.219 1.14 (0.566) -0.156 1.31 (0.512)
INV_REC + INV_REC*BUSY -0.002 0.00 (0.993) 0.474 0.94 (0.332) 0.341 0.21 (0.648) -0.764 2.65 (0.104)
Financial Risk
ROA + ROA*BUSY 0.23 4.49 (0.034) ** 0.64 2.33 (0.127) 0.12 0 (0.971) 0.06 2.33 (0.127)
LOSS + LOSS*BUSY 0.34 11.59 (0.000) *** 0.37 4.45 (0.035) ** 0.25 1.05 (0.305) 0.356 5.77 (0.016) **
LEVERAGE + LEVERAGE*BUSY 0.21 0.82 (0.366) 0.79 4.25 (0.039) ** -0.575 0.99 (0.319) -0.038 0.01 (0.918)
CASH + CASH*BUSY -0.59 6.29 (0.012) ** -0.39 1.08 (0.2997) -0.055 0.01 (0.922) -0.9711 6.68 (0.010) ***
ALTMAN_Z + ALTMAN_Z*BUSY -0.05 13.42 (0.000) *** -0.05 3.9 (0.0482) ** -0.014 0.19 (0.662) -0.0653 12.3 (0.001) ***
Litigation Risk
SIZE + SIZE*BUSY -0.13 52.67 (0.000) *** -0.116 14.43 (0.000) *** -0.150 12.39 (0.000) *** -0.130 23.87 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + LIT_RISK*BUSY 0.106 0.74 (0.390) 0.065 0.11 (0.736) 0.146 0.16 (0.690) 0.146 0.54 (0.463)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes: Panel B presents the results from the Wald chi-squared tests for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the coefficients on the 
determinant and interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when 
a direction prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.





Auditor Client-Continuance Decisions - non-Big Four Analysis 
 
 
(Continued on the next page)
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -0.070 (0.882) -0.416 (0.723) -1.161 (0.151) 0.909 (0.189)
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + 0.920 (0.123) 1.334 (0.235) -0.597 (0.631) 1.561 (0.035) **
REV_GROWTH + 0.045 (0.439) 0.604 (0.145) -0.001 (0.501) -0.264 (0.723)
ICOFR + 0.858 (0.000) *** 0.585 (0.066) * 0.846 (0.003) *** 1.141 (0.000) ***
NT_FILING + 0.36 (0.034) ** 0.591 (0.017) ** 0.596 (0.034) ** 0.139 (0.352)
M&A + -0.211 (0.840) 0.428 (0.153) -0.356 (0.819) -0.549 (0.949)
INV_REC + -0.321 (0.766) 1.181 (0.122) -0.297 (0.635) -0.752 (0.882)
ABS_DA*BUSY + -0.370 (0.658) -1.704 (0.787) 0.358 (0.429) -0.201 (0.565)
REV_GROWTH*BUSY + 0.119 (0.371) -1.278 (0.951) 0.688 (0.163) 0.539 (0.163)
ICOFR*BUSY + -0.293 (0.905) 0.012 (0.490) -0.498 (0.893) -0.574 (0.961)
NT_FILING*BUSY + 0.567 (0.005) *** 0.155 (0.352) 0.299 (0.252) 1.077 (0.004) ***
M&A*BUSY + 0.287 (0.122) -0.104 (0.584) 0.615 (0.041) ** 0.462 (0.117)
INV_REC*BUSY + -0.127 (0.594) -0.913 (0.783) 1.053 (0.150) -0.640 (0.803)
Financial Risk
ROA - -0.194 (0.232) -0.484 (0.199) 0.094 (0.549) 0.089 (0.594)
LOSS + 0.219 (0.129) -0.0250 (0.523) 0.462 (0.046) ** 0.276 (0.161)
LEVERAGE + 0.847 (0.046) ** -0.378 (0.612) 0.302 (0.391) 1.802 (0.003) ***
CASH - 0.027 (0.524) 1.803 (0.965) -0.424 (0.311) -0.254 (0.350)
ALTMAN_Z - 0.0409 (0.977) 0.079 (0.939) 0.034 (0.733) 0.023 (0.752)
(2004-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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(Continued on the next page) 
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
ROA*BUSY - 0.113 (0.643) 0.154 (0.594) -0.253 (0.389) 0.039 (0.536)
LOSS*BUSY + -0.079 (0.629) 0.072 (0.447) -0.249 (0.719) -0.092 (0.606)
LEVERAGE*BUSY + -1.239 (0.978) -0.214 (0.550) 0.543 (0.335) -2.703 (1.000)
CASH*BUSY - -0.104 (0.420) -1.224 (0.153) 0.781 (0.788) -0.174 (0.408)
ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - -0.006 (0.414) -0.015 (0.411) 0.020 (0.612) 0.002 (0.519)
Litigation Risk
SIZE - -0.082 (0.023) ** -0.293 (0.002) *** -0.045 (0.266) -0.023 (0.344)
LIT_RISK + 0.167 (0.218) 0.125 (0.397) -0.223 (0.701) 0.399 (0.048) **
SIZE*BUSY + 0.0682 (0.039) ** 0.252 (0.023) ** 0.106 (0.117) -0.034 (0.696)
LIT_RISK*BUSY + 0.212 (0.182) 0.096 (0.428) 0.556 (0.106) 0.070 (0.417)
Constant -1.889 (0.003) *** -1.670 (0.153) -1.532 (0.305) -2.568 (0.005) ***
Observations 8,072 1,473 2,245 4,249
Number of Switches 625 149 178 298
Area Under ROC 0.6629 0.6812 0.6889 0.6979
Pseudo R
2
0.0507 0.0798 0.0682 0.075
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
SWITCHSWITCH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2004-2015)
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [1]. Columns 1 - 4 represent logistic regression models 
examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the relation between the determinants of client 
continuance and auditor client-continuance decisions, SWITCH for non-Big Four auditor-client relationships. P-values 
reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant 
difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All 





TABLE 10 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Joint Tests of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + ABS_DA*BUSY 0.55 1.45 (0.228) -0.37 0.11 (0.735) -0.239 0.06 (0.806) 1.36 4.54 (0.033)
REV_GROWTH + REV_GROWTH*BUSY 0.164 0.55 (0.459) -0.674 1.62 (0.204) 0.687 2.95 (0.086) * 0.275 0.72 (0.395)
ICOFR + ICOFR*BUSY 0.565 18.06 (0.000) *** 0.597 4.92 (0.027) ** 0.348 1.7 (0.192) 0.567 8.75 (0.003) ***
NT_FILING + NT_FILING*BUSY 0.927 41.81 (0.000) *** 0.746 8.94 (0.003) *** 0.895 8.32 (0.004) *** 1.216 27.77 (0.000) ***
M&A + M&A*BUSY 0.076 1.36 (0.506) 0.324 2.45 (0.294) 0.259 2.14 (0.343) -0.087 2.81 (0.245)
INV_REC + INV_REC*BUSY -0.448 1.27 (0.261) 0.268 0.11 (0.746) 0.756 1.14 (0.287) -1.392 6.49 (0.011) **
Financial Risk
ROA + ROA*BUSY -0.08 0.25 (0.616) -0.33 1.04 (0.309) -0.159 0.12 (0.733) 0.128 0.34 (0.559)
LOSS + LOSS*BUSY 0.14 1.09 (0.296) 0.05 0.02 (0.882) 0.213 0.69 (0.408) 0.184 0.88 (0.347)
LEVERAGE + LEVERAGE*BUSY -0.39 1.17 (0.280) -0.59 0.33 (0.568) 0.845 1.69 (0.193) -0.901 3.28 (0.070)
CASH + CASH*BUSY -0.08 0.07 (0.786) 0.58 0.75 (0.388) 0.357 0.43 (0.513) -0.428 1.27 (0.259)
ALTMAN_Z + ALTMAN_Z*BUSY 0.03 3.82 (0.051) * 0.06 2.28 (0.131) 0.054 1.5 (0.221) 0.025 1.44 (0.230)
Litigation Risk
SIZE + SIZE*BUSY -0.0138 0.24 (0.627) -0.041 0.36 (0.546) 0.061 1.29 (0.257) -0.057 2.25 (0.134)
LIT_RISK + LIT_RISK*BUSY 0.379 5.02 (0.025) ** 0.221 0.39 (0.531) 0.469 1.12 (0.290) 0.469 4.13 (0.042) **
(8)
Notes: Panel B presents the results from the Wald chi-squared tests for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the coefficients 
on the determinant and interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, 
respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.






Audit Effort and Client-Continuance Decisions - Big Four Analysis 
 
 
(Continued on the next page)
Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -0.128 (0.278) -0.200 (0.174) -0.166 (0.260) -0.108 (0.433)
Audit Risk
ABS_DA - -0.043 (0.369) 0.109 (0.654) 0.043 (0.573) -0.194 (0.109)
REV_GROWTH - -0.159 (0.000) *** -0.147 (0.093) * -0.116 (0.044) ** -0.181 (0.002) ***
ICOFR + 0.356 (0.000) *** 0.427 (0.000) *** 0.403 (0.000) *** 0.254 (0.001) ***
NT_FILING + 0.303 (0.000) *** 0.212 (0.001) *** 0.318 (0.000) *** 0.409 (0.000) ***
M&A + 0.125 (0.000) *** 0.134 (0.001) *** 0.140 (0.000) *** 0.118 (0.000) ***
INV_REC + 0.964 (0.000) *** 0.911 (0.000) *** 0.908 (0.000) *** 1.016 (0.000) ***
ABS_DA*BUSY + -0.235 (0.066) * -0.694 (0.017) ** -0.376 (0.091) * 0.039 (0.582)
REV_GROWTH*BUSY + 0.008 (0.444) 0.030 (0.412) 0.032 (0.342) -0.040 (0.703)
ICOFR*BUSY + -0.139 (0.995) -0.120 (0.919) -0.156 (0.939) -0.114 (0.902)
NT_FILING*BUSY + 0.025 (0.348) 0.119 (0.096) * -0.054 (0.688) -0.061 (0.678)
M&A*BUSY + 0.019 (0.264) -0.047 (0.816) 0.017 (0.348) 0.036 (0.166)
INV_REC*BUSY + 0.169 (0.110) 0.052 (0.383) 0.244 (0.076) * 0.192 (0.117)
Financial Risk
ROA - -0.103 (0.271) -0.488 (0.002) *** -0.231 (0.182) 0.075 (0.650)
LOSS + 0.062 (0.037) ** 0.017 (0.397) 0.042 (0.214) 0.083 (0.031) **
LEVERAGE + 1.065 (0.000) *** 0.991 (0.000) *** 1.001 (0.000) *** 1.133 (0.000) ***
CASH - -0.297 (0.002) *** -0.327 (0.014) ** -0.222 (0.049) ** -0.321 (0.004) ***
ALTMAN_Z - -0.003 (0.345) 0.007 (0.754) -0.001 (0.458) -0.006 (0.212)
LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2005-2015) (2005-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
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(Continued on the next page)
Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
ROA*BUSY - -0.090 (0.305) 0.276 (0.929) -0.002 (0.497) -0.266 (0.097) *
LOSS*BUSY + -0.035 (0.804) -0.050 (0.739) -0.057 (0.822) -0.015 (0.614)
LEVERAGE*BUSY + -0.165 (0.928) -0.069 (0.664) -0.186 (0.896) -0.175 (0.904)
CASH*BUSY - 0.116 (0.846) 0.110 (0.750) 0.074 (0.691) 0.138 (0.847)
ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - 0.012 (0.932) -0.009 (0.230) 0.009 (0.773) 0.020 (0.987)
Litigation Risk
SIZE + 0.293 (0.000) *** 0.292 (0.000) *** 0.287 (0.000) *** 0.295 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + -0.058 (0.855) -0.035 (0.707) -0.047 (0.769) -0.075 (0.881)
SIZE*BUSY + 0.010 (0.129) 0.030 (0.001) *** 0.015 (0.079) * 0.003 (0.378)
LIT_RISK*BUSY + -0.049 (0.809) -0.082 (0.895) -0.080 (0.878) -0.018 (0.607)
Constant 10.760 (0.000) 9.863 (0.000) 11.220 (0.000) 10.950 (0.000)
Observations 18,976 3,303 5,295 10,378
Pseudo R
2
0.744 0.744 0.734 0.753
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2005-2015) (2005-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [3].Columns 1 - 4 represent ordinary least square 
regression models examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the relation between the determinants 
of client continuance and auditor client-continuance decisions, SWITCH for Big Four auditor-client relationships. P-
values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant 
difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Panel B: Joint Tests of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + ABS_DA*BUSY -0.278 10.73 (0.001) *** -0.585 10.15 (0.001) *** -0.333 4.38 (0.036) ** -0.155 2.43 (0.119)
REV_GROWTH + REV_GROWTH*BUSY -0.151 25.07 (0.000) *** -0.117 2.19 (0.139) -0.084 3.47 (0.062) * -0.221 25.63 (0.000) ***
ICOFR + ICOFR*BUSY 0.217 46.21 (0.000) *** 0.307 34.79 (0.000) *** 0.247 11.89 (0.001) *** 0.140 11.91 (0.001) ***
NT_FILING + NT_FILING*BUSY 0.328 63.28 (0.000) *** 0.331 30.13 (0.000) *** 0.264 10.66 (0.001) *** 0.348 26.59 (0.000) ***
M&A + M&A*BUSY 0.144 83.29 (0.000) *** 0.087 17.41 (0.000) *** 0.157 48.39 (0.000) *** 0.154 62.04 (0.000) ***
INV_REC + INV_REC*BUSY 1.133 113.73 (0.000) *** 0.963 47.07 (0.000) *** 1.152 72.38 (0.000) *** 1.208 99.27 (0.000) ***
Financial Risk
ROA + ROA*BUSY -0.193 14.66 (0.000) *** -0.212 5.07 (0.024) ** -0.233 7.42 (0.007) *** -0.191 10.02 (0.002) ***
LOSS + LOSS*BUSY 0.028 1.79 (0.181) -0.033 0.59 (0.441) -0.015 0.22 (0.639) 0.068 7.02 (0.008) ***
LEVERAGE + LEVERAGE*BUSY 0.900 182.99 (0.000) *** 0.922 92.57 (0.000) *** 0.815 78.51 (0.000) *** 0.958 152.15 (0.000) ***
CASH + CASH*BUSY -0.181 8.63 (0.003) *** -0.217 5.33 (0.021) ** -0.148 3.2 (0.074) * -0.183 6.42 (0.011) **
ALTMAN_Z + ALTMAN_Z*BUSY 0.010 4.34 (0.037) ** -0.002 0.11 (0.743) 0.008 1.37 (0.243) 0.014 7.41 (0.007) ***
Litigation Risk
SIZE + SIZE*BUSY 0.3026 3095.54 (0.000) *** 0.322 2339.36 (0.000) *** 0.302 1915.96 (0.000) *** 0.298 2352.55 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + LIT_RISK*BUSY -0.1069 9.29 (0.002) -0.117 6.6 (0.010) -0.093 8.42 (0.004) -0.093 5.4 (0.020)
Notes: Panel B presents the results from the F -test for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the coefficients on the determinant and 
interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction 
prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY 0.302 (0.050) ** 0.093 (0.814) 0.468 (0.030) ** 0.244 (0.154)
Audit Risk
ABS_DA - -0.288 (0.049) ** -0.084 0.457 -0.336 (0.136) -0.330 (0.051) *
REV_GROWTH - -0.173 (0.001) *** -0.077 0.359 -0.230 (0.005) *** -0.140 (0.016) **
ICOFR + 0.142 (0.008) *** 0.763 0.000 *** 0.138 (0.062) * 0.045 (0.268)
NT_FILING + 0.077 (0.128) -0.074 0.627 0.162 (0.042) ** 0.096 (0.155)
M&A + 0.146 (0.000) *** -0.020 0.531 0.166 (0.003) *** 0.165 (0.000) ***
INV_REC + 0.431 (0.001) *** 0.513 0.053 * 0.444 (0.024) ** 0.381 (0.005) ***
ABS_DA*BUSY + -0.335 (0.941) -0.341 0.687 -0.573 (0.943) -0.091 (0.636)
REV_GROWTH*BUSY + -0.053 (0.739) -0.093 0.609 -0.069 (0.728) -0.067 (0.759)
ICOFR*BUSY + -0.009 (0.510) -0.399 0.953 0.117 (0.171) -0.046 (0.679)
NT_FILING*BUSY + 0.017 (0.420) 0.304 0.083 * -0.181 (0.915) -0.029 (0.595)
M&A*BUSY + 0.000 (0.516) 0.109 0.283 -0.045 (0.724) 0.001 (0.491)
INV_REC*BUSY + -0.036 (0.632) -0.143 0.743 -0.005 (0.523) -0.048 (0.629)
Financial Risk
ROA - 0.262 (0.996) 0.354 0.956 0.290 (0.944) 0.209 (0.971)
LOSS + 0.067 (0.042) ** -0.102 0.802 0.075 (0.128) 0.066 (0.082) *
LEVERAGE + 0.628 (0.000) *** 0.890 0.022 ** 0.814 (0.000) *** 0.527 (0.002) ***
CASH - -0.119 (0.220) -0.092 0.504 0.161 (0.850) -0.312 (0.034) **
ALTMAN_Z - -0.018 (0.006) *** -0.032 0.037 ** -0.012 (0.134) -0.019 (0.021) **
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2005-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
Ln_FEES Ln_FEES Ln_FEES Ln_FEES
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
ROA*BUSY - -0.173 (0.060) * -0.356 (0.093) * -0.178 (0.189) -0.126 (0.152)
LOSS*BUSY + -0.031 (0.710) 0.212 (0.075) * -0.020 (0.601) -0.074 (0.874)
LEVERAGE*BUSY + 0.053 (0.413) -0.360 (0.795) -0.030 (0.553) 0.158 (0.250)
CASH*BUSY - -0.170 (0.121) -0.092 (0.334) -0.387 (0.023) ** -0.049 (0.383)
ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - 0.013 (0.943) 0.050 (0.992) 0.004 (0.638) 0.012 (0.869)
Litigation Risk
SIZE + 0.338 (0.000) *** 0.374 (0.000) *** 0.364 (0.000) *** 0.319 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + -0.054 (0.771) -0.080 (0.679) -0.031 (0.629) -0.067 (0.784)
SIZE*BUSY + -0.037 (0.986) -0.005 (0.609) -0.046 (0.974) -0.037 (0.979)
LIT_RISK*BUSY + 0.034 (0.345) 0.052 (0.399) -0.057 (0.718) 0.066 (0.244)
Constant 10.170 (0.000) *** 9.645 (0.000) 9.02 0.000 *** 9.915 (0.000) ***
Observations 5,922 568 1,765 3,589
R2 0.629 0.646 0.640 0.643
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2005-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [3].Columns 1 - 4 represent ordinary least square 
regression models examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the relation between the 
determinants of client continuance and auditor effort allocation, SWITCH for non-Big Four auditor-client 
relationships. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** 
Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction 
prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Ln_FEES Ln_FEES Ln_FEES Ln_FEES
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Panel B: Joint Test of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + ABS_DA*BUSY -0.623 10.73 (0.001) *** -0.425 10.15 (0.001) *** -0.909 4.38 (0.036) ** -0.421 2.43 (0.119)
REV_GROWTH + REV_GROWTH*BUSY -0.226 25.07 (0.000) *** -0.170 2.19 (0.139) -0.299 3.47 (0.062) * -0.207 25.63 (0.000) ***
ICOFR + ICOFR*BUSY 0.133 46.21 (0.000) *** 0.364 34.79 (0.000) *** 0.255 11.89 (0.001) *** -0.001 11.91 (0.001) ***
NT_FILING + NT_FILING*BUSY 0.093 63.28 (0.000) *** 0.230 30.13 (0.000) *** -0.019 10.66 (0.001) *** 0.067 26.59 (0.000) ***
M&A + M&A*BUSY 0.146 83.29 (0.000) *** 0.089 17.41 (0.000) *** 0.121 48.39 (0.000) *** 0.166 62.04 (0.000) ***
INV_REC + INV_REC*BUSY 0.395 113.73 (0.000) *** 0.370 47.07 (0.000) *** 0.439 72.38 (0.000) *** 0.333 99.27 (0.000) ***
Financial Risk
ROA + ROA*BUSY 0.089 14.66 (0.000) *** -0.002 5.07 (0.024) ** 0.112 7.42 (0.007) *** 0.083 10.02 (0.002) ***
LOSS + LOSS*BUSY 0.036 1.79 (0.181) 0.110 0.59 (0.441) 0.055 0.22 (0.639) -0.007 7.02 (0.008) ***
LEVERAGE + LEVERAGE*BUSY 0.681 182.99 (0.000) *** 0.530 92.57 (0.000) *** 0.784 78.51 (0.000) *** 0.685 152.15 (0.000) ***
CASH + CASH*BUSY -0.289 8.63 (0.003) *** -0.184 5.33 (0.021) ** -0.226 3.2 (0.074) * -0.361 6.42 (0.011) **
ALTMAN_Z + ALTMAN_Z*BUSY -0.005 4.34 (0.037) ** 0.018 0.11 (0.743) -0.008 1.37 (0.243) -0.007 7.41 (0.007) ***
Litigation Risk
SIZE + SIZE*BUSY 0.3009 3095.54 (0.000) *** 0.369 2339.36 (0.000) *** 0.319 1915.96 (0.000) *** 0.282 2352.55 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + LIT_RISK*BUSY -0.0201 9.29 (0.002) -0.028 6.6 (0.010) 0.000 8.42 (0.004) 0.000 5.4 (0.020)
(3) (4)
Notes: Panel B presents the results from the F -test for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the coefficients on the determinant and 
interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction 
prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH





90 Day Analysis 
 
 
(Continued on the next page)
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -0.758 (0.036) ** -1.688 (0.006) *** -0.080 (0.917) -0.422 (0.461)
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + -0.149 (0.417) -0.891 (0.778) -0.085 (0.521) 0.652 (0.289)
REV_GROWTH + -0.161 (0.264) 0.292 (0.217) -0.830 (0.934) -0.499 (0.866)
ICOFR + 0.756 (0.000) *** 0.521 (0.021) ** 1.187 (0.000) *** 0.796 (0.002) ***
NT_FILING + 0.524 (0.002) *** 0.601 (0.008) *** 0.018 (0.483) 0.722 (0.016) **
M&A + 0.168 (0.115) 0.339 (0.051) * -0.167 (0.700) 0.041 (0.431)
INV_REC + -0.277 (0.237) -0.664 (0.838) -0.153 (0.575) -0.128 (0.583)
ABS_DA*BUSY + 0.296 (0.366) 0.428 (0.390) 0.043 (0.492) -0.014 (0.504)
REV_GROWTH*BUSY + 0.042 (0.450) -0.600 (0.876) 0.637 (0.171) 0.504 (0.185)
ICOFR*BUSY + 0.193 (0.173) 0.401 (0.102) -0.333 (0.786) 0.187 (0.289)
NT_FILING*BUSY + 0.074 (0.375) -0.013 (0.517) 0.724 (0.084) * -0.033 (0.531)
M&A*BUSY + -0.142 (0.200) -0.372 (0.924) 0.375 (0.159) -0.080 (0.612)
INV_REC*BUSY + -0.159 (0.364) 0.365 (0.318) 0.321 (0.366) -0.742 (0.849)
Financial Risk
ROA - 0.315 (0.880) 0.520 (0.873) 0.158 (0.613) 0.308 (0.807)
LOSS + 0.274 (0.034) ** 0.264 (0.138) 0.466 (0.095) * 0.102 (0.341)
LEVERAGE + 0.079 (0.421) -0.494 (0.768) 0.013 (0.494) 0.686 (0.131)
CASH - -0.443 (0.881) -0.803 (0.098) * -0.889 (0.154) 0.004 (0.503)
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Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
ROA*BUSY - -0.131 (0.659) 0.007 (0.504) -0.172 (0.402) -0.122 (0.387)
LOSS*BUSY + 0.078 (0.337) 0.088 (0.389) -0.041 (0.539) 0.265 (0.184)
LEVERAGE*BUSY + -0.006 (0.495) 1.255 (0.057) * -0.219 (0.583) -0.939 (0.902)
CASH*BUSY - 0.131 (0.621) 0.298 (0.661) 1.343 (0.919) -0.413 (0.268)
ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - 0.035 (0.926) 0.057 (0.862) 0.065 (0.881) 0.021 (0.729)
Litigation Risk
SIZE - -0.146 (0.000) *** -0.189 (0.000) *** -0.052 (0.110) -0.147 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + 0.297 (0.041) ** 0.257 (0.160) 0.391 (0.186) 0.288 (0.144)
SIZE*BUSY + 0.090 (0.000) *** 0.146 (0.001) *** -0.036 (0.752) 0.105 (0.008) ***
LIT_RISK*BUSY + -0.008 (0.483) 0.024 (0.467) -0.050 (0.544) 0.064 (0.415)
Constant -1.534 (0.006) *** -0.445 (0.626) -2.773 (0.003) *** -3.87 (0.001) ***
Observations 31,730 7,728 7,684 15,650
Number of Switches 908 345 188 375
Area Under ROC 0.6941 0.6913 0.7135 0.6963
Pseudo R
2
0.0598 0.0667 0.0627 0.0583
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
SWITCH_90 SWITCH_90 SWITCH_90 SWITCH_90
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2004-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [1]. Columns 1 - 4 represent logistic regression models 
examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the relation between the determinants of client 
continuance and auditor client-continuance decisions, SWITCH_90. P-values reported in parentheses are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values 
<0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Panel B: Joint Test of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + ABS_DA*BUSY 0.147 0.09 (0.766) -0.463 0.23 (0.632) -0.042 0 (0.970) 0.638 0.85 (0.356)
REV_GROWTH + REV_GROWTH*BUSY -0.119 0.31 (0.581) -0.308 0.72 (0.396) -0.193 0.21 (0.645) 0.005 0 (0.987)
ICOFR + ICOFR*BUSY 0.949 66.23 (0.000) *** 0.922 25.19 (0.000) *** 0.854 10.27 (0.001) *** 0.983 29.4 (0.000) ***
NT_FILING + NT_FILING*BUSY 0.5976 18.5 (0.000) *** 0.588 8.4 (0.004) *** 0.742 5.38 (0.020) ** 0.690 7.42 (0.006) ***
M&A + M&A*BUSY 0.026 1.51 (0.470) -0.033 2.73 (0.255) 0.208 1.31 (0.520) -0.038 0.1 (0.954)
INV_REC + INV_REC*BUSY -0.436 1.86 (0.172) -0.299 0.28 (0.595) 0.168 0.06 (0.808) -0.870 3.31 (0.069) *
Financial Risk
ROA + ROA*BUSY 0.184 1.09 (0.297) 0.53 1.45 (0.229) -0.01 0 (0.975) 0.19 0.64 (0.423)
LOSS + LOSS*BUSY 0.3515 10.79 (0.001) *** 0.35 3.06 (0.080) * 0.42 3.01 (0.083) * 0.37 5.46 (0.019) **
LEVERAGE + LEVERAGE*BUSY 0.07281 0.08 (0.784) 0.76 3.09 (0.079) * -0.21 0.11 (0.736) -0.25 0.4 (0.528)
CASH + CASH*BUSY -0.312 1.84 (0.175) -0.51 1.47 (0.226) 0.45 0.75 (0.386) -0.41 1.47 (0.226)
ALTMAN_Z + ALTMAN_Z*BUSY 0.0142 0.73 (0.394) 0.03 0.86 (0.354) 0.06 2.72 (0.099) * -0.01 0.17 (0.679)
Litigation Risk
SIZE + SIZE*BUSY -0.0558 11.95 (0.001) -0.043 2.2 (0.138) -0.088 6.96 (0.008) *** -0.042 3.1 (0.078) *




Notes: Panel B presents the results from the Wald chi-squared tests for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the coefficients on the determinant 
and interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction 










Big Four 90 Day Analysis 
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Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -1.680 (0.001) *** (2.771) (0.000) *** -0.524 (0.648) -1.204 (0.167)
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + 0.100 (0.458) 0.064 (0.480) 0.835 (0.339) 0.706 (0.376)
REV_GROWTH + -0.263 (0.220) 0.374 (0.207) -0.729 (0.867) -0.953 (0.929)
ICOFR + 0.656 (0.002) *** 0.488 (0.061) * 1.082 (0.017) ** 0.719 (0.030) **
NT_FILING + 0.670 (0.004) *** 0.777 (0.005) *** -0.294 (0.656) 1.214 (0.002) ***
M&A + 0.210 (0.094) * 0.242 (0.139) 0.201 (0.298) 0.036 (0.449)
INV_REC + -0.280 (0.292) -1.447 (0.969) 0.434 (0.335) 0.544 (0.277)
ABS_DA*BUSY + -0.578 (0.311) -0.937 (0.296) -1.923 (0.756) -0.927 (0.648)
REV_GROWTH*BUSY + 0.170 (0.348) -0.347 (0.292) 0.374 (0.319) 0.737 (0.180)
ICOFR*BUSY + 0.519 (0.028) ** 0.504 (0.089) * 0.085 (0.446) 0.700 (0.059) *
NT_FILING*BUSY + -0.174 (0.284) -0.211 (0.289) 1.059 (0.111) -0.706 (0.898)
M&A*BUSY + -0.175 (0.182) -0.290 (0.152) 0.001 (0.500) -0.008 (0.509)
INV_REC*BUSY + 0.082 (0.444) 1.575 (0.040) ** -0.820 (0.752) -1.129 (0.866)
Financial Risk
ROA - 0.159 (0.638) 0.455 (0.720) 0.028 (0.519) -0.085 (0.447)
LOSS + 0.206 (0.144) 0.213 (0.232) 0.657 (0.069) * -0.294 (0.786)
LEVERAGE + -0.537 (0.136) -1.185 (0.056) * 0.272 (0.400) 0.043 (0.480)
CASH - -0.954 (0.022) ** -1.514 (0.018) ** -1.434 (0.105) 0.033 (0.517)
ALTMAN_Z - -0.050 (0.017) ** -0.051 (0.881) -0.024 (0.319) -0.069 (0.019) **
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2004-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
SWITCH_90 SWITCH_90 SWITCH_90 SWITCH_90
82 
 
TABLE 14 (continued) 
 
(Continue on the next page) 
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
ROA*BUSY - 0.189 (0.642) 0.640 (0.741) -0.296 (0.348) 0.297 (0.659)
LOSS*BUSY + 0.161 (0.245) 0.295 (0.214) -0.335 (0.732) 0.629 (0.066) *
LEVERAGE*BUSY + 0.780 (0.088) * 2.182 (0.007) *** -1.143 (0.800) -0.020 (0.508)
CASH*BUSY - 0.294 (0.707) 0.821 (0.839) 1.354 (0.854) -0.851 (0.163)
ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - 0.024 (0.781) 0.041 (0.764) 0.051 (0.776) 0.015 (0.638)
Litigation Risk
SIZE - -0.259 (0.000) *** -0.281 (0.000) *** -0.206 (0.003) *** -0.267 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK + 0.141 (0.253) 0.167 (0.286) 0.495 (0.178) -0.013 (0.513)
SIZE*BUSY + 0.157 (0.000) *** 0.188 (0.001) *** 0.084 (0.169) 0.177 (0.005) ***
LIT_RISK*BUSY + 0.056 (0.406) 0.098 (0.385) -0.111 (0.579) 0.181 (0.329)
Constant 0.187 (0.795) 1.753 (0.073) * -1.144 (0.350) -2.001 (0.023) **
Observations 23,573 6,191 5,148 11,332
Number of Switches 657 287 119 251
Area Under ROC 0.7295 0.7169 0.7493 0.7285
Pseudo R
2
0.0843 0.0888 0.0913 0.0808
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
SWITCH_90
(1)
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [1]. Columns 1 - 4 represent logistic regression models 
examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the relation between the determinants of client 
continuance and auditor client-continuance decisions, SWITCH_90 for Big Four auditor-client relationships. P-
values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a 
significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is 
not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(2) (3) (4)
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Panel B: Joint Test of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val Sum χ2 p-val
Audit Risk
ABS_DA + ABS_DA*BUSY -0.478 0.51 (0.477) -0.873 0.53 (0.467) -1.088 0.33 (0.563) -0.221 0.06 (0.813)
REV_GROWTH + REV_GROWTH*BUSY -0.093 0.11 (0.745) 0.027 0.00 (0.952) -0.355 0.46 (0.496) -0.216 0.20 (0.651)
ICOFR + ICOFR*BUSY 1.175 67.39 (0.000) *** 0.992 23.70 (0.000) *** 1.167 10.67 (0.001) *** 1.419 38.09 (0.000) ***
NT_FILING + NT_FILING*BUSY 0.496 7.86 (0.005) *** 0.566 6.32 (0.012) ** 0.765 2.93 (0.087) * 0.508 1.91 (0.167)
M&A + M&A*BUSY 0.035 1.81 (0.404) -0.048 1.26 (0.533) 0.202 0.87 (0.649) 0.029 0.04 (0.979)
INV_REC + INV_REC*BUSY -0.198 0.25 (0.620) 0.128 0.04 (0.838) -0.386 0.17 (0.676) -0.585 0.86 (0.355)
Financial Risk
ROA + ROA*BUSY 0.348 1.62 (0.203) 1.095 2.95 (0.086) * -0.268 0.29 (0.593) 0.212 0.35 (0.556)
LOSS + LOSS*BUSY 0.367 8.14 (0.004) *** 0.508 4.72 (0.030) ** 0.322 1.01 (0.314) 0.335 3.22 (0.073) *
LEVERAGE + LEVERAGE*BUSY 0.243 0.62 (0.431) 0.997 4.27 (0.039) ** -0.871 1.06 (0.303) 0.023 0.00 (0.959)
CASH + CASH*BUSY -0.660 4.82 (0.028) ** -0.693 2.11 (0.146) -0.080 0.01 (0.916) -0.818 3.02 (0.082) *
ALTMAN_Z + ALTMAN_Z*BUSY -0.027 1.91 (0.167) * -0.010 0.08 (0.775) 0.027 0.35 (0.555) -0.055 4.81 (0.028) **
Litigation Risk
SIZE + SIZE*BUSY -0.102 21.71 (0.000) *** -0.093 6.26 (0.012) ** -0.123 6.60 (0.010) *** -0.090 7.52 (0.006) ***
LIT_RISK + LIT_RISK*BUSY 0.197 1.70 (0.192) * 0.265 1.21 (0.272) 0.384 1.14 (0.286) 0.168 0.48 (0.487)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes: Panel B presents the results from the Wald chi-squared tests for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the 
coefficients on the determinant and interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, 
<0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015) (2010-2015)




Client-Continuance Decisions – Change in Risk Factors Analysis 
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Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -0.075 (0.404) -0.338 (0.036) ** -0.065 (0.727) 0.0751 (0.594)
Audit Risk
Δ_ABS_DA + -0.135 (0.790) 0.427 (0.560) -0.128 (0.904) -0.692 (0.464)
Δ_REV_GROWTH + -0.068 (0.717) -0.346 (0.253) 0.275 (0.480) 0.135 (0.676)
Δ_ICOFR_1_0 ? 0.267 (0.201) 0.240 (0.369) 0.541 (0.115) -0.127 (0.781)
Δ_ICOFR_0_1 + 0.988 (0.000) *** 0.511 (0.078) * 1.354 (0.000) *** 1.026 (0.002) ***
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0 ? 0.018 (0.935) -0.705 (0.006) *** 0.189 (0.599) 1.426 (0.000) ***
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1 + 0.539 (0.012) ** 0.415 (0.150) -0.090 (0.838) 1.076 (0.004) ***
Δ_M&A_1_0 ? -0.223 (0.191) -1.129 (0.019) ** -0.054 (0.862) 0.066 (0.770)
Δ_M&A_0_1 + -0.088 (0.599) -0.204 (0.520) 0.395 (0.173) -0.387 (0.176)
Δ_INV_REC + 1.214 (0.236) -5.774 (0.005) *** 3.311 (0.205) 2.275 (0.318)
Δ_ABS_DA*BUSY + -0.314 (0.610) -0.845 (0.369) -2.096 (0.102) 1.267 (0.244)
Δ_REV_GROWTH*BUSY + -0.081 (0.735) 0.356 (0.373) -0.702 (0.147) -0.221 (0.573)
Δ_ICOFR_1_0*BUSY ? -0.544 (0.033) ** -0.605 (0.064) * -0.324 (0.473) 0.083 (0.877)
Δ_ICOFR_0_1*BUSY + 0.009 (0.971) 0.558 (0.143) -0.176 (0.692) -0.127 (0.750)
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0*BUSY ? 0.298 (0.253) 0.657 (0.044) ** 0.324 (0.482) -0.305 (0.492)
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1*BUSY + 0.399 (0.066) * 0.009 (0.983) 1.010 (0.069) * 0.362 (0.402)
Δ_M&A_1_0*BUSY ? 0.292 (0.151) 1.061 (0.047) ** 0.177 (0.646) 0.037 (0.894)
Δ_M&A_0_1*BUSY + 0.075 (0.715) -0.110 (0.785) -0.289 (0.443) 0.470 (0.076) *
Δ_INV_REC*BUSY + -0.867 (0.517) 3.190 (0.049) ** 0.854 (0.676) -1.173 (0.532)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2005-2015)
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Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
Financial Risk
Δ_ROA - -0.183 (0.615) -0.948 (0.037) ** 1.028 (0.008) *** -1.226 (0.053) *
Δ_LOSS_1_0 ? 0.348 (0.059) * 0.313 (0.346) 0.633 (0.078) * 0.313 (0.283)
Δ_LOSS_0_1 + 0.446 (0.005) *** 0.421 (0.171) * 0.752 (0.005) *** 0.216 (0.448)
Δ_LEVERAGE + 0.094 (0.877) 0.642 (0.458) 0.783 (0.505) -1.318 (0.321)
Δ_CASH - 0.440 (0.465) 0.288 (0.739) 1.100 (0.342) -0.353 (0.755)
Δ_ALTMAN_Z - -0.140 (0.003) *** -0.111 (0.084) * -0.226 (0.012) ** -0.045 (0.530)
Δ_ROA*BUSY - 0.179 (0.651) 0.287 (0.612) -1.215 (0.018) ** 1.642 (0.007)
Δ_LOSS_1_0*BUSY ? -0.157 (0.488) -0.507 (0.271) -0.118 (0.791) -0.186 (0.585)
Δ_LOSS_0_1*BUSY + -0.198 (0.315) -0.629 (0.119) -0.402 (0.236) 0.152 (0.644)
Δ_LEVERAGE*BUSY + -0.476 (0.535) -1.067 (0.357) -0.741 (0.624) 0.543 (0.717)
Δ_CASH*BUSY - -0.668 (0.323) -0.750 (0.449) -1.991 (0.128) 0.845 (0.488)
Δ_ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - 0.081 (0.144) 0.119 (0.149) 0.226 (0.962) -0.086 (0.301)
(2005-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
86 
 
TABLE 15 (continued) 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
  
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
Litigation Risk
Δ_SIZE ? 0.051 (0.677) 0.231 (0.131) -0.030 (0.915) -0.292 (0.199)
LIT_RISK ? 0.035 (0.798) -0.037 (0.852) 0.174 (0.525) 0.145 (0.534)
Δ_SIZE*BUSY ? -0.057 (0.691) -0.379 (0.059) * 0.200 (0.532) 0.306 (0.237)
LIT_RISK*BUSY ? 0.086 (0.577) 0.092 (0.691) -0.083 (0.789) 0.055 (0.823)
Constant -2.315 (0.001) *** -1.158 (0.063) * -3.983 (0.000) *** -3.759 (0.000) ***
Observations 28,799 7,151 7,157 14,048
Number of Switches 1,548 419 394 735
Area Under ROC 0.6646 0.6573 0.7009 0.6588
Pseudo R
2
0.0451 0.0484 0.0617 0.0516
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2005-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [1].Columns 1 - 4 represent logistic regression models 
examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the relation between changes in the determinants of client 
continuance and auditor client-continuance decisions, SWITCH. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, 
<0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH
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Panel B: Joint Test of Coefficients










Δ_ABS_DA+Δ_ABS_DA*BUSY -0.449 0.52 (0.470) -0.418 0.11 (0.742) -2.224 7.42 (0.007) *** 0.575 0.97 (0.324)
Δ_REV_GROWTH+Δ_REV_GROWTH*BUSY -0.150 1.06 (0.303) 0.010 0.36 (0.551) -0.427 0.84 (0.360) -0.086 0.11 (0.738)
Δ_ICOFR_1_0+Δ_ICOFR_1_0*BUSY -0.277 1.22 (0.269) -0.365 0.47 (0.492) 0.217 0.21 (0.648) -0.044 0.70 (0.402)
Δ_ICOFR_0_1+Δ_ICOFR_0_1*BUSY 0.997 0.00 (0.952) 1.069 1.82 (0.178) 1.178 0.12 (0.726) 0.899 0.09 (0.758)
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0+Δ_NT_FILING_1_0*BUSY 0.316 23.14 (0.000) *** -0.048 3.66 (0.056) * 0.513 0.55 (0.459) 1.121 30.69 (0.000) ***
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1+Δ_NT_FILING_0_1*BUSY 0.938 38.93 (0.000) *** 0.424 4.66 (0.031) ** 0.920 6.70 (0.010) *** 1.438 41.40 (0.000) ***
Δ_M&A_1_0+Δ_M&A_1_0*BUSY 0.069 1.74 (0.418) -0.068 4.58 (0.101) 0.123 0.41 (0.813) 0.103 0.10 (0.951)
Δ_M&A_0_1+Δ_M&A_0_1*BUSY -0.013 0.26 (0.879) -0.314 0.68 (0.711) 0.106 1.65 (0.438) 0.083 2.14 (0.344)
Δ_INV_REC+Δ_INV_REC*BUSY 0.347 0.68 (0.409) -2.584 6.34 (0.012) ** 4.165 9.76 (0.002) *** 1.102 0.68 (0.409)
Financial Risk
Δ_ROA+Δ_ROA*BUSY -0.004 1.32 (0.251) -0.661 0.05 (0.827) -0.187 0.50 (0.481) 0.416 4.44 (0.035) **
Δ_LOSS_1_0+Δ_LOSS_1_0*BUSY 0.191 1.41 (0.235) -0.194 0.58 (0.446) 0.515 4.49 (0.034) ** 0.127 0.26 (0.608)
Δ_LOSS_0_1+Δ_LOSS_0_1*BUSY 0.248 4.95 (0.026) ** -0.208 0.04 (0.834) 0.350 2.63 (0.105) 0.368 3.72 (0.054) *
Δ_LEVERAGE+Δ_LEVERAGE*BUSY -0.382 0.72 (0.395) -0.425 0.59 (0.441) 0.042 0.00 (0.979) -0.775 0.94 (0.332)
Δ_CASH+Δ_CASH*BUSY -0.228 0.33 (0.565) -0.462 3.04 (0.081) * -0.891 0.29 (0.587) 0.492 0.45 (0.502)
Δ_ALTMAN_Z+Δ_ALTMAN_Z*BUSY -0.059 2.33 (0.127) 0.008 3.43 (0.064) * 0.000 0.03 (0.867) -0.131 9.63 (0.002) ***
Litigation Risk
Δ_SIZE+Δ_SIZE*BUSY 0.086 0.22 (0.643) 0.194 3.18 (0.075) * 0.145 0.24 (0.621) -0.147 0.06 (0.811)
LIT_RISK+LIT_RISK*BUSY -0.022 0.42 (0.518) -0.416 0.45 (0.501) 0.374 0.07 (0.798) 0.451 1.74 (0.188)
(1) (2)
Notes: Panel B presents the results from the Wald chi-squared tests for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the coefficients 
on the determinant and interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, 
respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(4)
(2004-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
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Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY
Audit Risk
Δ_ABS_DA + -0.510 (0.801) 0.258 (0.377) -1.204 (0.769) -1.696 (0.937)
Δ_REV_GROWTH + -0.115 (0.660) -0.587 (0.933) 0.252 (0.333) 0.459 (0.194)
Δ_ICOFR_1_0 ? 0.947 (1.000) 1.008 (0.980) 1.306 (0.999) 0.499 (0.806)
Δ_ICOFR_0_1 + 1.222 (0.000) *** 0.834 (0.011) ** 1.704 (0.000) *** 1.478 (0.000) ***
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0 ? 0.269 (0.798) -1.396 (0.047) ** -0.011 (0.492) 1.891 (1.000)
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1 + 0.376 (0.091) * 0.156 (0.347) -0.534 (0.807) 1.479 (0.001) ***
Δ_M&A_1_0 ? -0.403 (0.033) ** -0.774 (0.060) * -0.211 (0.309) -0.260 (0.191)
Δ_M&A_0_1 + -0.184 (0.818) -0.120 (0.623) -0.121 (0.610) -0.328 (0.839)
Δ_INV_REC + 2.075 (0.079) * 2.678 (0.089) * 4.056 (0.094) * -0.885 (0.604)
Δ_ABS_DA*BUSY + 0.304 (0.343) -0.315 (0.613) -1.054 (0.708) 2.183 (0.047) **
Δ_REV_GROWTH*BUSY + 0.143 (0.335) 0.796 (0.054) * -0.736 (0.852) -0.376 (0.736)
Δ_ICOFR_1_0*BUSY ? -0.478 (0.076) * -0.513 (0.189) -0.932 (0.067) * 0.049 (0.531)
Δ_ICOFR_0_1*BUSY + 0.080 (0.394) 0.559 (0.119) -0.157 (0.598) -0.304 (0.742)
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0*BUSY ? 0.202 (0.699) 1.707 (0.971) -0.391 (0.311) -0.635 (0.153)
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1*BUSY + 0.389 (0.137) 0.178 (0.374) 1.355 (0.038) ** -0.188 (0.630)
Δ_M&A_1_0*BUSY ? 0.493 (0.972) 0.922 (0.950) 0.142 (0.605) 0.358 (0.843)
Δ_M&A_0_1*BUSY + 0.252 (0.150) -0.022 (0.519) 0.115 (0.416) 0.455 (0.115)
Δ_INV_REC*BUSY + -2.183 (0.883) -5.278 (0.981) -2.283 (0.723) 2.918 (0.220)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH
(2005-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
89 
 
TABLE 16 (continued) 
 
 
(Continue on the next page) 
  
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
Financial Risk
Δ_ROA - -0.720 (0.129) -1.644 (0.006) *** 0.438 (0.731) -1.022 (0.237)
Δ_LOSS_1_0 ? 0.137 (0.698) 0.269 (0.737) 0.330 (0.722) 0.148 (0.641)
Δ_LOSS_0_1 + 0.365 (0.041) ** 0.658 (0.029) ** 0.491 (0.086) * 0.214 (0.304)
Δ_LEVERAGE + -0.435 (0.712) 0.429 (0.338) -0.837 (0.689) -1.123 (0.744)
Δ_CASH - 0.716 (0.807) -0.393 (0.349) 2.944 (0.959) 1.011 (0.712)
Δ_ALTMAN_Z - -0.145 (0.021) ** -0.159 (0.053) * -0.294 (0.010) ** 0.0715 (0.740)
Δ_ROA*BUSY - 0.589 (0.806) 0.542 (0.752) -0.534 (0.272) 1.477 (0.846)
Δ_LOSS_1_0*BUSY ? 0.186 (0.726) -0.24 (0.331) 0.559 (0.799) 0.0616 (0.552)
Δ_LOSS_0_1*BUSY + -0.170 (0.748) -1.107 (0.988) -0.180 (0.655) 0.13 (0.391)
Δ_LEVERAGE*BUSY + 0.207 (0.416) -0.773 (0.714) 0.273 (0.448) 0.794 (0.342)
Δ_CASH*BUSY - -1.104 (0.133) 0.414 (0.627) -4.951 (0.011) ** -1.125 (0.290)
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Panel A: Logistic Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
Litigation Risk
Δ_SIZE ? -0.002 (0.991) 0.114 (0.556) -0.019 (0.958) -0.368 (0.171)
LIT_RISK ? -0.092 (0.991) -0.173 (0.456) 0.297 (0.443) -0.171 (0.599)
Δ_SIZE*BUSY ? -0.236 (0.182) -0.442 (0.068) * -0.106 (0.800) 0.115 (0.711)
LIT_RISK*BUSY ? 0.117 (0.182) 0.231 (0.393) -0.468 (0.272) 0.201 (0.555)
Constant -1.24 (0.007) *** -1.106 (0.060) * -3.641 (0.000) *** -3.986 (0.000) ***
Observations 21,831 5,848 5,160 10,398
Number of Switches 952 299 216 437
Area Under ROC 0.6917 0.6968 0.7343 0.6819
Pseudo R
2
0.0609 0.0789 0.0975 0.0678
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2005-2015) (2004-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [1]. Columns 1 - 4 represent logistic regression models 
examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect the relation between changes in the determinants of client 
continuance and auditor client-continuance decisions, SWITCH for Big Four auditor-client relationships. P-values 
reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant 
difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Panel B: Joint Test of Coefficients










Δ_ABS_DA+Δ_ABS_DA*BUSY -0.206 0.03 (0.864) -0.057 0.00 (0.979) -2.258 4.07 (0.044) ** 0.487 0.48 (0.489)
Δ_REV_GROWTH+Δ_REV_GROWTH*BUSY 0.028 0.01 (0.941) 0.209 0.00 (0.948) -0.484 0.78 (0.376) 0.083 0.16 (0.692)
Δ_ICOFR_1_0+Δ_ICOFR_1_0*BUSY 0.469 6.05 (0.014) ** 0.495 2.03 (0.154) 0.374 0.77 (0.379) 0.548 3.89 (0.048) **
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0+Δ_NT_FILING_1_0*BUSY 0.471 5.78 (0.016) ** 0.311 1.37 (0.242) -0.402 0.40 (0.528) 1.256 14.58 (0.000) ***
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1+Δ_NT_FILING_0_1*BUSY 0.765 11.85 (0.001) *** 0.334 0.95 (0.330) 0.821 2.90 (0.089) * 1.291 17.70 (0.000) ***
Δ_M&A_1_0+Δ_M&A_1_0*BUSY 0.090 3.27 (0.195) 0.148 4.51 (0.105) -0.069 0.21 (0.899) 0.098 0.90 (0.638)
Δ_M&A_0_1+Δ_M&A_0_1*BUSY 0.068 1.04 (0.595) -0.142 0.42 (0.810) -0.006 0.09 (0.956) 0.127 1.62 (0.445)
Δ_INV_REC+Δ_INV_REC*BUSY -0.108 0.14 (0.710) -2.600 3.82 (0.051) * 1.773 1.74 (0.187) 2.033 1.36 (0.243)
Financial Risk
Δ_ROA+Δ_ROA*BUSY -0.131 0.57 (0.449) -1.102 0.10 (0.752) -0.096 0.00 (0.949) 0.455 3.23 (0.072) *
Δ_LOSS_1_0+Δ_LOSS_1_0*BUSY 0.323 2.39 (0.122) 0.029 0.12 (0.730) 0.889 5.42 (0.020) ** 0.210 0.40 (0.529)
Δ_LOSS_0_1+Δ_LOSS_0_1*BUSY 0.195 2.01 (0.156) -0.449 0.47 (0.495) 0.311 1.65 (0.200) 0.344 2.25 (0.134)
Δ_LEVERAGE+Δ_LEVERAGE*BUSY -0.228 0.41 (0.520) -0.344 0.76 (0.382) -0.564 0.01 (0.904) -0.329 0.10 (0.757)
Δ_CASH+Δ_CASH*BUSY -0.388 0.68 (0.410) 0.021 0.22 (0.636) -2.007 2.17 (0.141) -0.114 0.00 (0.951)
Δ_ALTMAN_Z+Δ_ALTMAN_Z*BUSY -0.109 6.13 (0.013) ** 0.046 2.40 (0.121) -0.195 4.82 (0.028) ** -0.206 11.09 (0.001) ***
Litigation Risk
Δ_SIZE+Δ_SIZE*BUSY -0.094 6.39 (0.012) ** -0.059 5.54 (0.019) ** 0.278 0.27 (0.602) -0.539 2.67 (0.103)
LIT_RISK+LIT_RISK*BUSY -0.328 0.38 (0.537) -0.615 0.86 (0.355) 0.191 0.26 (0.608) -0.056 0.05 (0.831)
Notes: Panel B presents the results from the Wald chi-squared tests for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the coefficients on 
the determinant and interaction term are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, 
respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
SWITCH SWITCHSWITCH SWITCH
(2005-2015) (2005-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -0.027 (0.000) *** -0.189 (0.000) *** -0.015 (0.128) 0.009 (0.125)
Audit Risk
Δ_ABS_DA - 0.065 (0.920) 0.222 (0.913) -0.039 (0.698) 0.071 (0.912)
Δ_REV_GROWTH - 0.021 (0.933) 0.039 (0.759) 0.035 (0.923) 0.011 (0.766)
Δ_ICOFR_1_0 ? -0.140 (0.000) *** -0.284 (0.000) *** -0.122 (0.001) *** -0.094 (0.015) **
Δ_ICOFR_0_1 + 0.243 (0.000) *** 0.271 (0.000) *** 0.209 (0.000) *** 0.198 (0.000) ***
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0 - -0.037 (0.057) * -0.089 (0.046) ** -0.010 (0.619) -0.071 (0.043) **
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1 + 0.247 (0.000) *** 0.270 (0.000) *** 0.192 (0.000) *** 0.204 (0.000) ***
Δ_M&A_1_0 ? -0.021 (0.057) * -0.069 (0.086) * -0.011 (0.615) -0.011 (0.327)
Δ_M&A_0_1 + 0.042 (0.000) *** 0.029 (0.264) 0.000 (0.500) 0.067 (0.000) ***
Δ_INV_REC + -0.138 (0.934) 0.125 (0.354) -0.265 (0.967) -0.129 (0.123)
Δ_ABS_DA*BUSY - -0.047 (0.191) -0.245 (0.918) 0.000 (0.502) -0.006 (0.536)
Δ_REV_GROWTH*BUSY - 0.030 (0.955) 0.018 (0.612) 0.031 (0.842) 0.027 (0.894)
Δ_ICOFR_1_0*BUSY ? 0.091 (0.001) *** 0.214 (0.000) *** 0.117 (0.013) ** 0.042 (0.355)
Δ_ICOFR_0_1*BUSY + -0.078 (0.990) -0.065 (0.822) -0.025 (0.330) -0.057 (0.104)
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0*BUSY ? -0.048 (0.119) 0.021 (0.749) -0.119 (0.013) ** 0.046 (0.390)
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1*BUSY + -0.066 (0.951) -0.075 (0.148) -0.016 (0.408) -0.024 (0.346)
Δ_M&A_1_0*BUSY ? 0.015 (0.261) 0.062 (0.179) 0.013 (0.621) -0.001 (0.928)
Δ_M&A_0_1*BUSY + -0.005 (0.647) 0.011 (0.411) 0.023 (0.195) -0.025 (0.060) *
Δ_INV_REC*BUSY + -0.023 (0.580) -0.405 (0.140) 0.100 (0.288) 0.045 (0.384)
(4)
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
Financial Risk
Δ_ROA - -0.079 (0.013) ** -0.168 (0.050) ** -0.056 (0.168) -0.038 (0.201)
Δ_LOSS_1_0 ? -0.029 (0.052) * -0.057 (0.258) -0.037 (0.240) -0.021 (0.188)
Δ_LOSS_0_1 + 0.019 (0.077) * 0.020 (0.373) 0.037 (0.030) ** 0.017 (0.152)
Δ_LEVERAGE + 0.405 (0.000) *** 0.216 (0.157) 0.490 (0.000) *** 0.432 (0.000) ***
Δ_CASH - -0.323 (0.000) *** -0.332 (0.041) ** -0.376 (0.000) *** -0.253 (0.000) ***
Δ_ALTMAN_Z - 0.010 (0.982) 0.024 (0.942) 0.012 (0.931) 0.003 (0.697)
Δ_ROA*BUSY - -0.045 (0.124) 0.029 (0.603) -0.057 (0.199) -0.086 (0.042) **
Δ_LOSS_1_0*BUSY ? 0.016 (0.356) 0.067 (0.238) 0.021 (0.568) 0.004 (0.845)
Δ_LOSS_0_1*BUSY + 0.015 (0.180) 0.047 (0.249) -0.004 (0.557) 0.007 (0.365)
Δ_LEVERAGE*BUSY + 0.032 (0.331) 0.232 (0.164) -0.173 (0.931) 0.056 (0.277)
Δ_CASH*BUSY - 0.019 (0.612) -0.043 (0.414) 0.007 (0.527) 0.030 (0.651)
Δ_ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - -0.008 (0.084) * -0.031 (0.042) ** -0.005 (0.307) -0.001 (0.455)
LN_AUDFEE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
Litigation Risk
Δ_SIZE + 0.112 (0.000) *** 0.141 (0.000) *** 0.108 (0.000) *** 0.091 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK ? 0.017 (0.247) 0.019 (0.641) 0.006 (0.797) 0.037 (0.058) *
Δ_SIZE*BUSY + 0.004 (0.332) 0.012 (0.359) 0.016 (0.169) -0.007 (0.208)
LIT_RISK*BUSY ? 0.003 (0.719) 0.021 (0.543) -0.019 (0.300) 0.010 (0.337)
Constant -0.289 (0.290) 0.064 (0.835) 0.177 (0.000) *** -0.131 (0.000) ***
Observations 25,463 4,197 7,244 14,022
R
2




(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2005-2015) (2005-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [1].Columns 1 - 4 represent ordinary least square regression 
models examining whether auditors' resource constraints (BUSY) effect changes in the determinants of client continuance on 
auditor effort allocation, LN_AUDFEE. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by 
client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction 
prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Panel B: Joint Test of Coefficients
Joint Test Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val Sum F -test p-val
Audit Risk
Δ_ABS_DA+Δ_ABS_DA*BUSY -0.138 0.20 (0.652) 0.125 0.72 (0.396) -0.265 0.39 (0.534) -0.129 4.16 (0.041) **
Δ_REV_GROWTH+Δ_REV_GROWTH*BUSY 0.018 18.14 (0.000) *** -0.023 2.77 (0.096) * -0.038 10.13 (0.002) *** 0.065 5.82 (0.016) **
Δ_ICOFR_1_0+Δ_ICOFR_1_0*BUSY 0.051 9.62 (0.002) *** 0.057 5.16 (0.023) ** 0.066 0.09 (0.764) 0.038 4.07 (0.044) **
Δ_ICOFR_0_1+Δ_ICOFR_0_1*BUSY -0.050 5.65 (0.017) ** -0.070 1.15 (0.283) -0.005 0.19 (0.661) -0.051 1.53 (0.216)
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0+Δ_NT_FILING_1_0*BUSY 0.165 18.74 (0.000) *** 0.206 3.84 (0.050) * 0.184 14.04 (0.000) *** 0.141 0.75 (0.385)
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1+Δ_NT_FILING_0_1*BUSY -0.085 53.28 (0.000) *** -0.069 20.42 (0.000) *** -0.129 12.43 (0.000) *** -0.025 21.75 (0.000) ***
Δ_M&A_1_0+Δ_M&A_1_0*BUSY 0.181 3.97 (0.138) 0.195 3.69 (0.158) 0.176 0.13 (0.877) 0.180 1.31 (0.271)
Δ_M&A_0_1+Δ_M&A_0_1*BUSY -0.006 32.38 (0.000) *** -0.007 2.78 (0.249) 0.002 1.25 (0.288) -0.013 24.18 (0.000) ***
Δ_INV_REC+Δ_INV_REC*BUSY 0.036 5.08 (0.024) ** 0.040 3.13 (0.077) * 0.023 2.03 (0.155) 0.042 0.50 (0.482)
Financial Risk
Δ_ROA+Δ_ROA*BUSY 0.010 62.61 (0.000) *** 0.024 8.52 (0.004) *** 0.012 11.43 (0.001) *** 0.003 43.53 (0.000) ***
Δ_LOSS_1_0+Δ_LOSS_1_0*BUSY -0.124 2.22 (0.136) -0.139 0.31 (0.578) -0.114 0.87 (0.351) -0.124 3.09 (0.079) *
Δ_LOSS_0_1+Δ_LOSS_0_1*BUSY -0.013 13.48 (0.000) *** 0.009 3.91 (0.048) ** -0.017 5.01 (0.025) ** -0.017 4.05 (0.044) **
Δ_LEVERAGE+Δ_LEVERAGE*BUSY 0.034 135.37 (0.000) *** 0.067 20.74 (0.000) *** 0.033 22.55 (0.000) *** 0.023 89.45 (0.000) ***
Δ_CASH+Δ_CASH*BUSY 0.437 51.13 (0.000) *** 0.448 15.35 (0.000) *** 0.317 23.55 (0.000) *** 0.488 14.91 (0.000) ***
Δ_ALTMAN_Z+Δ_ALTMAN_Z*BUSY -0.304 0.61 (0.437) -0.375 0.57 (0.451) -0.369 1.70 (0.193) -0.223 0.38 (0.538)
Litigation Risk
Δ_SIZE+Δ_SIZE*BUSY 0.112 276.16 (0.000) *** 0.141 71.47 (0.000) *** 0.108 71.47 (0.000) *** 0.091 143.37 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK+LIT_RISK*BUSY 0.129 0.94 (0.333) 0.160 2.37 (0.124) 0.114 0.10 (0.751) 0.128 0.08 (0.779)
Notes: Panel B presents the results from the F -test for all determinants and interaction terms. It examines whether the sum of the coefficients on the determinant and interaction term 
are different from zero. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when a direction prediction is (is not) made. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.
Δ_LN_AUDFEE Δ_LN_AUDFEE Δ_LN_AUDFEE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
BUSY -0.033 (0.000) *** -0.219 (0.000) *** -0.015 0.184 0.0112 (0.101)
Audit Risk
Δ_ABS_DA - 0.094 (0.938) 0.299 (0.944) -0.057 (0.269) 0.068 (0.858)
Δ_REV_GROWTH - 0.027 (0.928) 0.097 (0.913) 0.051 (0.935) 0.002 (0.546)
Δ_ICOFR_1_0 ? -0.131 (0.000) *** -0.203 (0.000) *** -0.105 (0.018) ** -0.152 (0.013) **
Δ_ICOFR_0_1 + 0.254 (0.000) *** 0.259 (0.000) *** 0.208 (0.000) *** 0.201 (0.000) ***
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0 - -0.031 (0.156) -0.104 (0.043) ** -0.027 (0.262) -0.051 (0.202)
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1 + 0.313 (0.000) *** 0.293 (0.000) *** 0.272 (0.000) *** 0.271 (0.000) ***
Δ_M&A_1_0 ? -0.029 (0.022) ** -0.101 (0.026) ** -0.026 (0.322) -0.002 (0.880)
Δ_M&A_0_1 + 0.033 (0.012) ** 0.031 (0.275) -0.007 (0.616) 0.058 (0.000) ***
Δ_INV_REC + -0.058 (0.669) 0.293 (0.226) -0.242 (0.883) -0.052 (0.628)
Δ_ABS_DA*BUSY - 0.005 (0.527) -0.317 (0.058) * 0.209 (0.968) 0.048 (0.745)
Δ_REV_GROWTH*BUSY - 0.031 (0.918) -0.008 (0.458) 0.002 (0.521) 0.047 (0.962)
Δ_ICOFR_1_0*BUSY ? 0.108 (0.002) *** 0.158 (0.009) *** 0.102 (0.067) * 0.152 (0.023) **
Δ_ICOFR_0_1*BUSY + -0.122 (0.998) -0.115 (0.919) -0.022 (0.612) -0.091 (0.939)
Δ_NT_FILING_1_0*BUSY ? -0.104 (0.006) *** -0.012 (0.861) -0.120 (0.043) ** -0.049 (0.517)
Δ_NT_FILING_0_1*BUSY + -0.101 (0.974) -0.052 (0.727) -0.148 (0.961) -0.015 (0.566)
Δ_M&A_1_0*BUSY ? 0.019 (0.190) 0.090 (0.077) * 0.024 (0.417) -0.016 (0.308)
Δ_M&A_0_1*BUSY + 0.001 (0.470) 0.002 (0.485) 0.031 (0.143) -0.017 (0.825)
Δ_INV_REC*BUSY + -0.104 (0.745) -0.608 (0.922) 0.035 (0.442) 0.035 (0.433)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ_LN_AUDFEE Δ_LN_AUDFEE Δ_LN_AUDFEE Δ_LN_AUDFEE
(2005-2015) (2005-2006) (2007-2009) (2010-2015)
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
Financial Risk
Δ_ROA - -0.120 (0.033) ** -0.248 (0.066) * -0.141 (0.098) * 0.016 (0.575)
Δ_LOSS_1_0 ? -0.018 (0.316) -0.032 (0.575) -0.051 (0.168) -0.008 (0.714)
Δ_LOSS_0_1 + 0.051 (0.003) *** 0.082 (0.133) 0.040 (0.059) * 0.064 (0.002) ***
Δ_LEVERAGE + 0.406 (0.000) *** -0.110 (0.674) 0.539 (0.000) *** 0.508 (0.000) ***
Δ_CASH - -0.374 (0.000) *** -0.227 (0.148) -0.466 (0.000) *** -0.325 (0.000) ***
Δ_ALTMAN_Z - 0.010 (0.920) 0.025 (0.876) 0.008 (0.739) -0.002 (0.402)
Δ_ROA*BUSY - -0.036 (0.300) 0.094 (0.708) -0.001 (0.498) -0.186 (0.018) **
Δ_LOSS_1_0*BUSY ? 0.013 (0.542) 0.058 (0.362) 0.036 (0.395) -0.006 (0.807)
Δ_LOSS_0_1*BUSY + -0.024 (0.874) -0.053 (0.748) -0.006 (0.574) -0.045 (0.957)
Δ_LEVERAGE*BUSY + 0.111 (0.099) * 0.590 (0.014) ** -0.112 (0.806) 0.070 (0.265)
Δ_CASH*BUSY - 0.082 (0.832) -0.131 (0.290) 0.127 (0.821) 0.100 (0.849)
Δ_ALTMAN_Z*BUSY - -0.006 (0.211) -0.045 (0.027) ** 0.001 (0.534) 0.009 (0.879)
(2010-2015)
LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE
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Panel A: Regression Results
Variables Pred coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val coef p-val
Litigation Risk
Δ_SIZE + 0.116 (0.000) *** 0.086 (0.014) ** 0.112 (0.000) *** 0.105 (0.000) ***
LIT_RISK ? 0.012 (0.220) 0.034 (0.339) 0.018 (0.344) -0.001 (0.928)
Δ_SIZE*BUSY + 0.008 (0.333) 0.052 (0.114) 0.002 (0.480) 0.024 (0.171)
LIT_RISK*BUSY ? 0.001 (0.934) 0.016 (0.684) -0.026 (0.203) 0.010 (0.375)
Constant 0.298 (0.310) 0.731 (0.029) ** 0.183 (0.000) *** -0.143 (0.003) ***
Observations 19,225 3,438 5,372 10,415
R
2
0.167 0.211 0.156 0.142
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE LN_AUDFEE
Notes: Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation [3] using an ordinary least square regression model. It examines the effect of 
auditor’s resource constraints on the determinants of client-continuance on Δ_LN_AUDFEE. P-values reported in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by client. *, **, *** Indicates a significant difference at one- (two)-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05, <0.01, respectively, when 
a direction prediction is (is not) made. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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